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I. INTRODUCTION 
Courts have always been the final repository of hope for parents 
and students who feel that their schools are consigning them to 
second-class citizenship.1 In the United States, no modern 
educational injustice has a longer or more abusive history than racial 
segregation,2 and its effective redress has proven all but impossible 
without occasional judicial intervention.3 Now, concerned parents 
are finding new legal avenues towards desegregating their schools, 
by relying on state courts and constitutions.4 But there are warning 
signs that those courts may decide—for the first time ever—that 
     †  Will Stancil is an attorney and Research Fellow at the Institute on 
Metropolitan Opportunity. 
     †† Jim Hilbert is an Associate Professor of Law at Mitchell Hamline School of 
Law.1. See MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 5 (2009) (“Only with court involvement has our nation 
made significant inroads into our intractable educational inequities.”); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111 
(2004) (“[T]he simple reality is that without judicial action equal educational 
opportunity will never exist.”). 
2. In the words of Martin Luther King, Jr., “[s]egregation is a glaring evil. . . .
Segregation is nothing but slavery covered up with certain niceties of complexity.” 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Facing the Challenge of a New Age, Address at the First 
Annual Institute on Non-Violence and Social Change, in Montgomery, Ala., (Dec. 
3, 1956) in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN
LUTHER KING, JR. 142 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). According to a recent study 
by the Government Accounting Office, not only is school segregation still a 
problem in American schools, it is increasing. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-16-345, K–12 EDUCATION: BETTER USE OF INFORMATION COULD
HELP AGENCIES IDENTIFY DISPARITIES AND ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 12 
(2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676745.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT] 
(“Specifically, according to our analysis of [the Department of] Education’s data, 
the number of schools where 90 to 100 percent of the students were eligible for free 
or reduced-price lunch and 90 to 100 percent of the students were Black or Hispanic 
grew by 143 percent from school years 2000-01 to 2013-14.”). 
3. In the absence of judicial intervention, policy makers seldom do anything
to address segregated schools. See Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-
Parents Involved Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1015, 1021 (2008) (“[S]cores of school districts and communities . . . have 
essentially offered no strategy for or even intention of addressing racial, ethnic, and 
socioeconomic isolation in their schools”). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 102–57 (describing desegregation cases
based on state constitutional law). 
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claims of racial segregation fall outside the purview of the judicial 
system.5  
Over several decades, education advocates have developed 
“educational adequacy” lawsuits as a vehicle for educational 
reforms.6 While the claims in these suits vary, they all share a basic 
structure.7 Educational adequacy lawsuits assert that a state’s 
constitution creates either a legislative obligation to provide an 
education with particular characteristics, or a fundamental right to 
education.8 Plaintiffs in these suits then allege that some defect in a 
state’s K–12 school system results in a failure to meet those 
requirements, or else violates that fundamental right. In doing so, 
the plaintiffs seek to override the legislatively-developed educational 
system to correct the inequity.9  
Most often, the asserted defect is funding inequality or 
insufficiency, such as a state’s school funding formula that prevents 
constitutionally adequate funding.10 But other claims have proven 
viable as well. One such claim is a segregation claim. Segregation, 
particularly racial segregation, is the grandparent of all educational 
inequality in the United States.11 As long as parents have been 
fighting for fairer schools, segregation has been at the heart of those 
fights.12 Although few in number, educational adequacy segregation 
5. See Lia Epperson, Civil Rights Remedies in Higher Education: Jurisprudential
Limitations and Lost Moments in Time, 23 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 343, 372 
(2017) (“As a result of shifts in the Supreme Court composition and social and 
political climate, the Supreme Court disfavors court-based remedies altogether, 
favoring only limited, forward-looking ‘diversity’ rationales.”). 
6. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1283–96 (2003) (detailing the history of such cases 
involving educational adequacy lawsuits). 
7. See infra Part II.B–C (describing state-based education reform cases). 
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New
Paradigm, 2 F. ON PUB. POL’Y 207, 214–15 (2006), http://forumonpublicpolicy.com/ 
vol2no2.edlaw/gormley.pdf (cataloging cases where state supreme courts 
invalidated state education systems for violating state constitutions). 
10. See Koski, supra note 6, at 1203–09 (discussing different theories of school
finance litigation). 
11. Racial segregation in our schools precedes the civil war and dates back to
the early 1800s. The most famous early case upholding school segregation is from 
1849 in Boston. See Roberts v. Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 205 (1849) (upholding a school 
system that maintained schools for the “exclusive instruction of white children”). 
12. See id.
3
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lawsuits stand out.13 They are a novel mechanism for attacking a 
morally and politically evocative problem against which previous 
legal remedies have sometimes fallen short.14  
However, educational adequacy lawsuits have met resistance, 
and segregation claims are no exception.15 In recent years, there 
have been indications that some courts have come to see the 
education system as a policy consideration for the legislature, 
resulting in the dismissal of education clause suits under the 
principle of justiciability.16 
This article addresses the intersection of justiciability, education 
clause claims, and segregation. It will argue that education clause 
claims are often justiciable, and that education clause claims based 
on racial segregation are particularly justiciable.17 Part I provides 
background on the historic roots of education policy and 
educational inequality.18 Part II describes historical efforts to secure 
integrated and equitable education from federal and state courts.19 
Part III summarizes the doctrine of justiciability and analyzes cases 
in which it has been held to prevent education clause claims in state 
courts.20 Part IV shows how the harms of segregation form a special 
case that supports the justiciability of education clause claims.21 
II. BACKGROUND ON SCHOOLS
A. Legal Basis of Public Education 
Education has always been one of the core functions of state 
government.22 While the word “education” does not appear in the 
13. See Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts
in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & 
C.L. 83, 95 n.53 (2010) (discussing educational adequacy lawsuits). 
14. See infra text accompanying notes 100–01 (discussing the failure of federal
courts to effectively address school segregation). 
15. Id.
16. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 95–103 (chronicling growing
justiciability concerns in education adequacy litigation). 
17. See infra Part V. 
18. See infra Part I.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (“Providing public schools
ranks at the very apex of the function of a State.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 
483, 493 (1954) (“[E]ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and 
4
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federal Constitution,23 all fifty states have explicit language relating 
to education in their state constitutions.24 States regard education 
not just as an imperative state function, but revere it as uniquely 
important among the state’s other responsibilities.25 As the Vermont 
Supreme Court recognized, “[o]nly one governmental service—
public education—has ever been accorded [such] constitutional 
status.”26 Other states share this same perspective.27 Because the 
federal Constitution does not contain an education clause, there is 
no federal constitutional supremacy limiting what states can derive 
from their state constitutions.28   
State constitutions require legislatures to create education 
systems.29 There is considerable variation among the states in their 
local governments.”). State supreme courts agree. As the West Virginia Supreme 
Court held, “[o]ur Constitution manifests, throughout, the people’s clear mandate 
to the Legislature, that public education is a prime function of our State 
government.” Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 884 (W. Va. 1979). State constitutions 
often clearly articulate such mandates. For example, the Washington Constitution 
states “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the 
education of all children residing within its borders.” WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
23. See Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 681 (“[T]here is, of course, no specific reference
to public education in the United States Constitution . . . .”); see also San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education is not among the 
rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.”). 
24. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1087 n.532 (2003) (listing all fifty states’ education clauses); see 
also Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education 
in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 814 (1985) (“The most direct sources of the duty 
to educate are state constitutions.”). 
25. See Shaman, supra note 24 at 1088 n.532 (“[Education is] the essential
prerequisite that allows our citizens to be able to appreciate, claim and effectively 
realize their established rights.”). 
26. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 392 (Vt. 1997).
 27. See, e.g., Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 492 (Ark. 
2002) (“[E]ducation has been of paramount concern to the citizens of this state 
since the state’s inception is beyond dispute. It is safe to say that no program of state 
government takes precedence over it.”); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 
1353, 1356 (N.H. 1997) (“[P]ublic education differs from all other services of the 
State. No other governmental service plays such a seminal role in developing and 
maintaining a citizenry.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 
516, 554 (Mass. 1993) (“The crux of the Commonwealth’s duty lies in its obligation 
to educate all of its children.”). 
28. See Gormley, supra note 9, at 213 (“The federal Constitution sets the floor,
beneath which states may not fall. But a state may always go beyond that floor, and 
grant more expansive rights under the state constitution.”). 
29. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (requiring the legislature to “establish
5
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constitutional language and the way they treat educational rights.30 
At one end of the spectrum are the twenty-one state “establishment 
provisions,” which simply require states to establish a free public 
school system “and nothing more.”31 In the middle are eighteen state 
“quality provisions,” which direct states to provide an educational 
system “of a specific quality.”32 Further along that continuum, there 
are six state “strong mandate” provisions that both establish a level 
of quality and provide a strong mandate to achieve it.33 Finally, at the 
a general and uniform system of public schools”). 
30. State education clauses can be divided into four categories based upon the
level of duty imposed by the text. Ratner, supra note 24, at 814 n.143–46 (citing 
Erica Black Grubb, Breaking the Language Barrier: The Right To Bilingual Education, 9 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 52, 66–70 (1974)); see also William E. Thro, Judicial Humility: 
The Enduring Legacy of Rose v. Council for Better Education, 98 KY. L.J. 717, 725 
(2010) [hereinafter Thro, Judicial Humility] (refining Grubb and Ratner’s basic 
framework). See generally, William E. Thro & Carlee Poston Escue, Doubt or Deference: 
Comparing the South Dakota and Washington School Finance Decisions, 281 EDUC. L. REP. 
771, 771 n.3 (2012). 
31. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726 (listing states with
establishment provisions for education in their constitutions). A typical example of 
an establishment provision clause is Tennessee’s, which states that “[t]he General 
Assembly shall provide for the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a 
system of free public schools.” TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12. See Ratner, supra note 24, 
at 815 (“Provisions in the first group contain only general education language and 
are exemplified by the Connecticut Constitution: ‘There shall always be free public 
elementary and secondary schools in the state.’” (citing CONN CONST. art. VIII, 
§ 1)).
32. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art.
XIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon 
the intelligence of the people, it is the duty of the legislature to establish a general 
and uniform system of public schools. The legislature shall make such provisions by 
taxation or otherwise as will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools 
throughout the state.”); see also Ratner, supra note 24, at 815 (“Provisions in the 
second group emphasize the quality of public education.”). The West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals discussed and subcategorized this type of provision at 
length. See Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865–78 (W. Va. 1979). Generally, the 
specific quality includes either “thorough,” “efficient,” or both. Id. As the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals observed, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Ohio, and Pennsylvania require “thorough and efficient” systems; Colorado, Idaho, 
and Montana require “thorough” systems; and Arkansas, Delaware, Illinois, 
Kentucky, and Texas require “efficient” systems. Id. at 865. 
33. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. Provisions in the third
group contain a stronger and more specific education mandate than those in the 
first and second groups. Ratner, supra note 24, at 815. A typical clause is the Rhode 
Island Constitution, which requires the legislature “to promote public schools and 
to adopt all means which they may deem necessary and proper to secure . . . the 
6
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far end are five state “high duty provisions,” which require states to 
place education “above other governmental functions such as 
highways or welfare.”34 
Importantly, regardless of the variations in the textual language, 
every state constitution imposes some duty on the state to provide a 
minimum level of public education to its children.35 Even states with 
arguably the weakest provisions require, at a minimum, that the state 
“maintain[s] free public schools.”36 For example, the Tennessee 
Constitution states that “[t]he General Assembly shall provide for 
the maintenance, support and eligibility standards of a system of free 
public schools.”37 States with constitutional text on the other end of 
the spectrum go much further. The Washington Supreme Court 
explained that its constitutional provision “does not merely seek to 
broadly declare policy, explain goals, or designate objectives to be 
accomplished. It is declarative of a constitutionally imposed [d]uty.”38 
In addition to the legislative duties related to education, some 
states have determined that education is a fundamental right. 
However, there is again variation among states.39 Fifteen states, for 
advantages . . . of education.” R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1. See CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 
(“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the 
preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall 
encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and 
agricultural improvement.”). 
34. Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 726. The provisions in the fourth
group contain the strongest commitment to education. Ratner, supra note 24, at 
816. An example is the Washington State Constitution’s education clause, which 
provides that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for 
the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or 
preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.” WASH. CONST art. IX, § 1. 
Although other states have education clauses that qualify for this category, 
Washington is the only one that makes the duty “paramount.” See Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 84 (Wash. 1978). 
35. See Ratner, supra note 24, at 816 (explaining how “[a]ll four categories [of
constitutional text] impose duties on the state to provide some form of public 
education”). 
36. Id.
 37. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; see also Ratner, supra note 24, at 816 (citing the 
New York and Connecticut constitutions). 
38. Id. at 816 (quoting Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 585 P.2d at 85 (emphasis
added)). See GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The provision of an adequate public 
education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”). 
39. There also appears to be at least a loose relationship between the text of
the constitution and whether state courts have found education to be a fundamental 
right. See Thro, Judicial Humility, supra note 30, at 727 (“[I]f the text of the 
7
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example, already consider education a fundamental right through 
judicial action or constitutional amendment,40 while twenty-two 
states have interpreted their education clause to confer an 
affirmative obligation on the state to provide an adequate 
education.41 Without exception, the right to education under state 
constitutional law has required a minimal guarantee of quality 
education.42   
B. Growth of Inequality in Public Education 
Rights and obligations aside, in practice, schools often fail to 
provide equal opportunity for quality education to students.43 Racial 
disparities, present since the days of formal statutory segregation, 
continue to be both dramatic and entrenched.44 For example, 
African American students’ achievement on the National 
Assessment of Educational Progress lags twenty-seven scaled points 
behind white students in reading and thirty-one points in math.45 
constitution is nothing more than an establishment provision, then there is no 
quality standard or fundamental right.”). 
40. See Gormley, supra note 9, at 219 (“The highest courts of at least fourteen
states, at one time or another, have declared that education is a fundamental right 
under their state constitutions.”). The list includes Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 219 n.63. “Florida amended 
its Constitution in 1998 to specifically provide that ‘the education of children is a 
fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida.’” Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. 
art. IX, § 1). Professor Gormley also notes that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
stated that education is a fundamental right under the State Constitution. Id. (citing 
Sch. Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5, 9 (Pa. 1995)). But 
that court later seemed to retreat from that position. Id. (citing Marrero ex rel. 
Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999)). 
41. Anne Gordon, California Constitutional Law: The Right to an Adequate
Education, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 323, 351–52 (2016). Importantly, “only a minority of 
states have found that their education clauses confer no substantive right.” Id. at 
352. 
42. See id. at 352–53 (“Where a state’s high court has found a right to education,
none has found that right to exist without a guarantee of quality.”). 
43. See Derek Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C.L. REV. 373, 374 (2012). 
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2009, app. A
at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009)), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/ 
2009081.pdf. In a slightly earlier analysis, researchers found little to no change in 
math and reading achievement gaps for the previous fifteen years. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC.,THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2007, 39, 144 tbl.14-1 (2007), 
8
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This disparity is equivalent to two to three years of learning.46 The 
so-called “achievement gap”47 between white students and most 
students of color has been substantial for decades.48   
Segregated schools are largely to blame for these disparities.49 A 
recent study by the United States Government Accounting Office 
found that such disparities along racial lines “are particularly acute 
among schools with the highest concentrations” of students of color 
and low-income students.50 Students of color who attend segregated 
schools score lower on achievement tests and other learning 
assessments.51 Segregated schools have lower graduation rates, lower 
https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007064.pdf. 
46. See CHRISTOPHER LUBIENSKI & SARAH THEULE LUBIENSKI, NAT’L CTR. OF
PRIVATIZATION IN EDUC., CHARTER, PRIVATE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIC 
ACHIEVEMENT: NEW EVIDENCE FROM NAEP MATHEMATICS DATA 5 (2006), 
http://www.ncspe.org/publications_files/OP111.pdf (explaining how to interpret 
achievement gaps on the NAEP). Stated differently, African-American eighth-
graders are earning scores equivalent to white students in sixth grade. Black, supra 
note 43, at 404. 
 47. See Cassandra Abbott, Note, The “Race to the Top” and the Inevitable Fall to the 
Bottom: How the Principles of the “Campaign for Fiscal Equity” and Economic Integration 
Can Help Close the Achievement Gap, 2013 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 93, 113 n.137 (2013) 
(“The term ‘achievement gap’ has a derogatory connotation in the sense that it 
implies that the ‘gap’ is largely a student-centered problem.”). 
48. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., The Space Between School Desegregation Court Orders
and Outcomes: The Struggle to Challenge White Privilege, 90 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1721–22 
(2004). 
49. Decades of data confirm segregation undermines student achievement. See
GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 37 (“The consensus of nearly 
60 years of social science research on the harms of school segregation is clear: 
separate remains extremely unequal.”). Of course, other forms of racism are 
responsible as well. As just one example, the federal government recently concluded 
that racism was a “real problem” in contributing to the racial disparities in student 
discipline. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T. OF EDUC., JOINT “DEAR 
COLLEAGUE” LETTER ON NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
4 (2014) (“[I]n our investigations we have found cases where African-American 
students were disciplined more harshly and more frequently because of their race 
than similarly situated white students. In short, racial discrimination in school 
discipline is a real problem.”). 
50. GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 42.
51. See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Martha Bottia, Integrated Education and
Mathematics Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1043 
(2010); Stephanie Southworth, Examining the Effects of School Composition on North 
Carolina Student Achievement Over Time, 18 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 24 
(2010); Eric Hanushek et al., New Evidence About Brown v. Board of Education: The 
9
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college attendance rates, and students from such schools are less 
likely to obtain a four-year degree.52  
One reason for segregated schools’ negative impact on student 
achievement is the disparity in resources.53 In a joint policy paper on 
the importance of diversity, the United States Departments of 
Education and Justice acknowledged that segregated schools are far 
more likely to have fewer and lower quality educational resources, 
such as fewer classroom materials, deficient technology and facilities, 
and less challenging curricula.54 Segregated schools are also more 
likely to be staffed with less qualified teachers and suffer a higher 
degree of teacher turnover.55   
However, resource disparities alone do not account for all the 
harms of racial segregation.56 Segregation also reinforces negative 
Complex Effects of School Racial Composition on Achievement, 27 J. LAB. ECON. 349, 351 
(2009). 
52. See Suzanne E. Eckes, Aaron J. Butler, and Natasha M. Wilson, Brown v.
Board of Education’s 60th Anniversary: Still No Cause for a Celebration, 311 EDUC. L. REP. 
1, 36 (2015) (discussing the correlation between segregated schools and college 
attendance); ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 39 (discussing the 
correlation between segregated and high school dropout and college success). 
Segregated education also impacts student attitudes and other benefits. See john a. 
powell, Segregation and Education Inadequacy in the Twin Cities Public Schools, 17 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 337, 343 (1996) (“Homogenous education fails to 
prepare students of all races for life in a multicultural society. Segregated schools 
deny all students the benefit of exposure to diverse views and perspectives.”). 
Students in segregated schools are separated from important networks that have 
lasting impacts on future employment opportunities. See Derek Black, The Case for 
the New Compelling Government Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
923, 953 (2002) (“Attending racially diverse schools opens up social networks to 
racial minorities, which often lead to additional job opportunities. As these benefits 
increase, they will perpetuate themselves naturally, and further integrate the job 
market and social networks.”). 
53. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE
VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 1 (2011) [hereinafter DOJ & DOE JOINT 
GUIDANCE], http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-20111 
1.html. Students in segregated schools are also subjected to more suspensions and
disciplinary actions. See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 21–24. 
54. See DOJ & DOE JOINT GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 1.
55. Id.
56. PHILIP TEGELER, ROSLYN ARLIN MICKELSON & MARTHA BOTTIA, NAT’L
COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY, RESEARCH BRIEF: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT SCHOOL
INTEGRATION, COLLEGE ATTENDANCE, AND THE REDUCTION OF POVERTY 1 (2010), 
http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBriefNo4.pdf (discussing how 
students at integrated schools have higher education aspirations and lower levels of 
10
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social and interpersonal mechanisms which harm children.57 For 
example, segregated schools lack access to professional and 
academic social networks, which are a critical aspect in educational 
advancement, college attendance, and ultimately employment.58 In 
addition, segregation reduces children’s exposure to people from 
different social and ethnic backgrounds, which impairs their ability 
to form cross-group or interracial friendships and working 
relationships.59 
Segregation’s impact on student achievement is, in part, a 
consequence of the strong relationship between racial isolation and 
poverty concentration.60 As many as half of all students in highly 
racially segregated schools are in schools that are also impacted by 
concentrated poverty.61 Concentrated poverty, on its own, negatively 
impacts educational achievement.62 For instance, a study by the 
National Center for Education Statistics shows lower achievement 
among students in high poverty schools.63 In 2007, the average 
violence than their peers at racially-isolated schools). 
57. Id. 
58. Id.
59. See CAROLE LEARNED-MILLER, NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY RESEARCH
BRIEF: HOW TO SUPPORT THE SOCIAL-EMOTIONAL WELL-BEING OF STUDENTS OF COLOR 
(2017), http://school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityResearchBrief11.pdf. 
60. See, e.g., GARY ORFIELD ET AL., BROWN AT 62: SCHOOL SEGREGATION BY RACE,
POVERTY AND STATE, 1–2 (2016) (describing the link between the two and finding 
that “[m]any schools are affected by both at the same time. . . .”); Kristi L. Bowman, 
A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public Schools, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 47, 55–56 (2009) (“[T]he more black and brown a school’s 
population is, the more likely it is that students in that school are predominantly 
poor.”). 
61. See ORFIELD & FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 15. “This means that these
students face almost total isolation not only from white and Asian students but also 
from middle class peers as well.” Id. 
62. See Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1545, 1547 (2007) (“Researchers have consistently found that schools with high 
concentrations of poverty present, on average, a very difficult environment for 
student learning.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (“An extensive body of research 
over the past 10 years shows a clear link between schools’ socioeconomic (or 
income) composition and student academic outcomes. That is, the nationally 
representative studies we reviewed (published from 2004 to 2014) showed that 
schools with higher concentrations of students from low-income families were 
generally associated with worse outcomes, and schools with higher 
concentrations of students from middle- and high-income families were generally 
associated with better outcomes.”). 
63. See The CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2007, supra note 45, at 18.
11
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reading and math scores for fourth- and eighth-grade students in 
schools where fifty-one to seventy-five percent of students were 
eligible for free or reduced-price lunches was roughly two grade 
levels lower than students in schools where only eleven to twenty-five 
percent of students were eligible for discounted lunches.64 While a 
student’s individual poverty status has some impact on achievement, 
the overall level of poverty in the school is a more powerful 
contributor.65 The combination of both racial and economic 
segregation creates significant barriers to learning for students of 
color trapped in “double segregation.”66 
III. CORRECTING SCHOOL DISPARITIES WITH LITIGATION
A. Federal Courts 
Segregation has been at the center of school litigation since at 
least 1930.67 That year, the NAACP commissioned the “Margold 
64. Id.
65. See Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal
to Separate and Unequal Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 44 (2007) 
(reviewing studies and concluding that “the socioeconomic status of the student 
body is the most important, school-related factor for academic success, even more 
important than an individual student’s wealth”); Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1549 
(“Low-income students do not typically perform as well academically as middle class 
children, with one striking exception: low-income students attending middle class 
schools perform better, on average, than middle class students in high-poverty 
schools.”). 
66. ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 60, at 1. For example, a recent study analyzed
more than 100 million test scores from 2009 to 2012 of public school children, 
grades three through eight, in over 300 metropolitan areas to determine whether it 
is “the racial or socioeconomic composition of schools that drives the persistent 
association between segregation and achievement inequality.” Sean F. Reardon, 
School Segregation and Racial Academic Achievement Gaps, 2 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC.
SCI. 34, 35 (2016). The resulting data shows “an association between racial school 
segregation and achievement gaps, net of many socioeconomic differences between 
white and minority families . . . [which is] driven by the strong association between 
racial segregation per se and racial differences in school poverty.” Id. at 50. The 
study concludes that “the racial difference in the proportion of students’ 
schoolmates who are poor is the key dimension of segregation driving th[e] 
association [between segregation and achievement gaps].” Id. at 19. Of course, both 
aspects of this segregation have independent impacts. Racial segregation brings its 
own special sort of negative impact on learning. See powell, supra note 52, at 344 
(“[E]conomic accounts do not tell the whole story. . . . [R]acial segregation creates 
harms independent of economic segregation.”). 
67. See Leland B. Ware, Setting the Stage for Brown: The Development and 
12
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Report,” which carefully plotted a legal campaign against 
educational segregation as the first step in a decades-long battle 
against Jim Crow in the courts.68 For years, plaintiffs attacking school 
segregation were forced to rely on federal courts and federal 
constitutional rights, for the simple reason that they could not 
expect a fair hearing from the state courts which enforced the very 
Jim Crow laws they were fighting.69  
The modern root of school desegregation law is Brown v. Board 
of Education.70 In Brown, the Supreme Court found that “[s]eparate 
educational facilities are inherently unequal,” and that intentional 
government operation of such facilities violates equal protection 
principles.71 The correct application of these principles was 
unaddressed in the Brown decision, and follow-up cases created 
opportunities for districts to delay implementation.72 These 
omissions, combined with “massive resistance” in some parts of the 
Implementation of the NAACP’s School Desegregation Campaign, 1930–1950, 52 MERCER
L. REV. 631, 632 (2001). 
68. Id. at 632, 640 (detailing the efforts and describing the Margold Report as
“the foundation of the NAACP’s strategy against segregation”); MARK V. TUSHNET,
THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950, 27–28 
(1987) (explaining how the Margold Report convinced the NAACP to attack 
segregation directly rather than argue for equalization of funding). 
69. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:
Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990) (documenting “court-
enforced racism” in Jim Crow-era courtrooms, including “refusal to accord black 
witnesses the civilities customarily accorded to white witnesses; attacks on the 
credibility of blacks as witnesses or accuseds; prosecutorial appeals to fear of 
violence by blacks; reliance on claims that racial minorities have a propensity toward 
violence; use of racist comments; and overtly racist conduct by judges.”). 
70. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 71. Id. at 495 (“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. 
Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others similarly situated for whom the 
actions have been brought are, by reason of the segregation complained of, 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”). 
72. Much of the blame lies with the Court’s declaration in Brown v. Board of 
Education 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II], that district courts issue “orders and 
decrees . . . as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially 
nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed. . . .” Id. at 301 (emphasis added). The 
phrase “with all deliberate speed,” in particular, was taken by many districts as giving 
permission to equivocate on the issue. Indeed, ten years after Brown, schools were 
nearly as segregated as they were before the Brown decision. See ORFIELD &
FRANKENBERG, supra note 49, at 4 (“In the great majority of the several thousand 
southern districts nothing had been done.”). 
13
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South and apathy about integration elsewhere, ensured that 
progress on desegregation remained essentially nonexistent in many 
areas for more than a decade after Brown.73 By the late 1960s, the 
courts began confronting the lack of progress on school 
integration.74 In doing so, the courts expanded school desegregation 
law in unique and unprecedented ways.75 
Federal desegregation law is built out of the need to forbid, 
prevent, and remedy the operation of an intentionally segregated 
school system—or what became known as a “dual system”—in 
violation of equal protection rights as established in Brown.76 
However, state and local resistance to judicial interventions became 
so extraordinary and widespread that almost every aspect of these 
interventions was eventually adjudicated before the United States 
Supreme Court.77 Consequently, the Court was forced to develop a 
robust, highly practical body of law that dealt very specifically with 
almost every dimension of the elimination of segregation in 
schools.78
The Supreme Court has defined “dual systems” broadly.79 The 
term does not describe any single policy, or even a constellation of 
 73. See generally Robert R. Merhige, Jr., The Promise of Equality: Reflections on the 
Post-Brown Era in Virginia, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 11 (2004); Davison M. Douglas, The 
Rhetoric of Moderation: Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 NW. U. 
L. REV. 92 (1994). 
 74. See generally Charles L. Zelden, From Rights to Resources: The Southern Federal 
District Courts and the Transformation of Civil Rights in Education, 1968–1974, 32 AKRON 
L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1999). 
 75. Id. at 479–80 (discussing the “commitment within the federal judicial 
hierarchy to use judicial powers to achieve ‘equality of results’ in civil rights 
matters”). Federal courts focused “their initial efforts on education,” using “the 
medium of race-based reallocation of resources. Id. “The effect of this shift in Civil 
Rights enforcement priorities away from the individual toward the group—and 
from color-blind nondiscrimination to preferential (i.e. color-based) 
discrimination—was explosive.” Id. 
 76. See, e.g., Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968) (“It was such dual 
systems that, 14 years ago, Brown I held unconstitutional, and, a year later, Brown II 
held must be abolished. . . .”). 
 77. See Zelden, supra note 74, at 472 (“Few in the South accepted the Supreme 
Court’s offer in Brown II of a voluntary process of desegregation in 1955, and this 
position of ‘massive opposition’ to civil rights reforms continued into the 1960s.”). 
 78. See A.B.A., TIMELINE OF SUPREME COURT SCHOOL-DESEGREGATION CASES
FROM BROWN TO FISHER, A.B.A. ANNUAL MEETING (2013), https://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/aba-ann 
ual2013/written_materials/20_lessons_in_leadership.authcheckdam. pdf. 
79. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 245–46 (1991). 
14
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policies, but instead the practice (varying in its particulars across 
regions or districts) of educating children of different races 
separately.80 In a typical school desegregation case, the finding that 
a government entity operates a dual system acts as a starting pistol 
which creates an obligation for the entity—or, if need be, the courts 
themselves—to dismantle the dual system and create a “unitary” 
system.81 While intentional (“de jure”) segregation is the only 
segregation proscribed by the federal Constitution, dual systems 
were treated in their totality as de jure segregation.82 
The United States Supreme Court held that dual systems must 
be eliminated “root and branch.”83 They are not cured until 
authorities, or the courts themselves, have purged both the root of 
intentional government discrimination and the branched-off, 
second-order effects that cause additional harm and reinforce the 
segregation.84 Thus, after a dual system is identified, its 
transformation into a unitary district typically requires the 
elimination of most forms of segregation throughout the system, 
regardless of whether the proximate cause of that segregation is 
government policy.85 
Despite this duty to eliminate dual systems, the Supreme Court 
placed practical limitations on school segregation remedies, stating 
that while vestiges of prior discrimination must be eliminated, 
80. See, e.g., id. at 262–64 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The evil to be remedied
in the dismantling of a dual system is the ‘[r]acial identification of the system’s 
schools.’” (quoting Green v. Cty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968))). 
81. See, e.g., id. at 246 (“Courts have used the terms ‘dual’ to denote a school
system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by race, and 
‘unitary’ to describe a school system which has been brought into compliance with 
the command of the Constitution.”). 
82. See, e.g., Green, 391 U.S. at 437–38 (“School boards such as the respondent
then operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with 
the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary 
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch.”). 
83. Id.
84. See id. at 435; see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 472 (1992) (holding it
is the “school district’s mandatory responsibility to eliminate all vestiges of a dual 
system.”). 
85. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 213 (1973) (“If the District Court
determines that the Denver school system is a dual school system, respondent 
School Board has the affirmative duty to desegregate the entire system root and 
branch.”); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) 
(“The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of 
state-imposed segregation.”); Green, 391 U.S. at 435. 
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districts do have the opportunity to prove that some racial 
concentrations are not a consequence of state action.86 
Concentrations not rooted in government discrimination need not 
be undone under this standard.87 The Supreme Court also created 
strong policy limitations, most notably limiting the extension of 
remedies across district borders in federal suits.88  
Once a court determines a school system is a dual system, its 
equitable powers to effect a remedy are expansive.89 If the school 
system’s educational authorities are found to have taken any degree 
of segregative discrimination, segregation elsewhere in the same 
system is presumed intentional.90 Potential remedies include: 
arranging for student transportation, monitoring school openings 
and closures, monitoring teachers and hirings, and adjusting 
attendance boundaries or zones.91 Until unitary status is achieved, 
these and other mechanisms remain available.92 
86. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (“In light of the above, it should be clear that
the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually one-race, schools within 
a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation 
by law.”). 
 87. See id. at 16 (providing that the required “task is to correct . . . the condition 
that offends the Constitution”). However, when segregation occurs in a system 
where the vestiges of state-sponsored discrimination are elsewhere apparent, the 
burden of demonstrating that there is no connection between the two is significant. 
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211 (“[A] connection between past segregative acts and present 
segregation may be present even when not apparent and . . . close examination is 
required before concluding that the connection does not exist.”). 
88. Perhaps the most-criticized desegregation decision has been Milliken v.
Bradley. 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974) (holding that federal desegregation remedies 
cannot include outlying districts not party to the case at hand, absent a showing that 
the outlying districts enacted policies with a significant segregative effect in the 
central district). By frequently eliminating the ability of segregation plaintiffs to 
incorporate whiter and more affluent suburbs, Milliken forced inner-city districts to, 
in effect, desegregate themselves—something that became impossible after large-
scale white flight. See, e.g., Myron Orfield, Milliken, Meredith, and Metropolitan 
Segregation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 364, 409–10 (2015). 
89. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (“In default by the school authorities of their
obligation to proffer acceptable remedies, a district court has broad power to 
fashion a remedy that will assure a unitary school system.”). 
90. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208 (“[A] finding of intentionally segregative school
board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a 
presumption that other segregated schooling within the system is not 
adventitious.”). 
91. Swann, 402 U.S. at 20–31.
92. Id.
16
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The Supreme Court laid out rules for when unitary status has 
been achieved.93 Factors include whether the district or school 
system has engaged in good-faith compliance with their 
constitutional obligations and whether vestiges of past 
discrimination have been eliminated “to the extent practicable.”94 
This is a searching inquiry in which courts look “not only at student 
assignments, but ‘to every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, 
transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities.’”95 
After finding a dual system, the United States Supreme Court’s 
school segregation rules have the practical effect of reducing the 
importance of the distinction between de jure (intentional) and de 
facto (unintentional) segregation.96 While the end goal remains the 
unraveling of government-backed segregation, the Supreme Court 
has generally recognized that the distinction between these concepts 
can easily blur at the margins.97 The Supreme Court adopted 
pragmatic rules that tend to, whenever plausible, treat existing racial 
divides as an outgrowth of historic discrimination.98 Doing so was a 
critical step in developing functional rules for effectuating 
desegregation; other approaches could have been hamstrung by 
continual assertions that easily-observed racial isolation was, 
nonetheless, the product of private choice.99 In Keyes v. School District 
93. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 487, 489–91 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v.
Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246–50 (1991). 
94. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249–250 (“The District Court should address itself to
whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since 
it was entered, and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated 
to the extent practicable.”). 
95. Id. at 250 (citing Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).
96. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 214–17 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). 
 97. This is because, after an intentionally segregated district is identified, the 
Supreme Court has strongly suggested that any existing segregation in that district 
should be eliminated as presumptively unconstitutional. For example, the Court has 
said that although schools where all students are of one race are not intrinsically 
forbidden, they are targets for desegregation. See, e.g., Swann, 402 U.S. at 26 (“The 
district judge or school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest 
possible degree of actual desegregation and will thus necessarily be concerned with 
the elimination of one-race schools.”). 
98. Green, 391 U.S. at 435–36 (discussing how the goal of the Court in these
cases has evolved from “the concern . . . with making an initial break in a long-
established pattern of excluding Negro children from schools attended by white 
children” to “[t]he transition to a unitary, nonracial system of public education.”).  
99. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 116 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
17
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No. 1, the high-water mark for expansive application of Brown, the 
Court stated: “We have never suggested that plaintiffs in school 
desegregation cases must bear the burden of proving the elements 
of de jure segregation as to each and every school or each and every 
student within the school system.”100 
Despite the availability of powerful desegregation remedies and 
the persistence of segregation, enforcement of federal 
desegregation rules has waned greatly.101 Access to these remedies 
relied on plaintiffs successfully persuading a court that a district is 
being operated as a dual system.102 Because overt racial assignment 
policies and other obvious manifestations of discrimination have 
become less frequent, proving the existence of a dual system has 
become more challenging.103 In other words, an array of powerful 
legal tools for evaluating and reducing school segregation remain 
available,104 but lie dormant as federal Equal Protection claims 
become harder to prove. 
B. Shifting to State Law Claims 
The “school finance” litigation movement developed largely 
because of the lack of progress in desegregation as litigators shifted 
the focus from the demographics of schools to the disparities in 
100. 413 U.S. at 200. 
 101. For example, one 2000 study found that while dozens of desegregation 
orders remained open across the country, “most cases suffer from extreme 
neglect—little activity will occur for years, if not decades.” Wendy Parker, The Future 
of School Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1160 (2000). 
102. See Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 (1973). 
103. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equality of Educational Opportunity in the 
Wake of Judicial Retreat from Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessons from North Carolina, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (2003). 
 104. See, e.g., Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 
83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1393–1411 (2016); Krista Kauble, Litigating Keyes: The New 
Opportunity for Litigators to Achieve Desegregation, 31 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 103 
(2012) (discussing how Keyes serves as a unique tool for litigators seeking reform on 
behalf of Latinx students); Kimberly C. West, A Desegregation Tool That Backfired: 
Magnet School and Classroom Desegregation, 102 YALE L.J. 2567, 2575–77 (1993). 
18
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funding between schools.105 The first “wave”106 of this resources-
based litigation relied on federal equal protection theories.107 In 
particular, the success of Serrano v. Priest, 108 in which the California 
Supreme Court held that the state’s school finance system violated 
the equal protection guarantees of both the California and United 
States Constitutions, inspired similar lawsuits, in more than thirty 
other states, mostly based on the federal Constitution.109   
Two years after Serrano, the United States Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez ended the use of federal courts for addressing the wide 
funding disparities between wealthy and low-income districts, 
concluding the first wave of school finance litigation.110 Litigators 
 105. See James E. Ryan, Sheff, Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 529, 532 n.14 (1999) (“School finance litigation began in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, at a time when the slow pace of desegregation was causing some civil 
rights activists to question the efficacy of desegregation as a tool to improve the 
educational opportunities of [students of color].”). School desegregation and 
school finance litigation shared the same goal of improving educational 
opportunity for low-income students of color. See Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of 
School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 L. & INEQ. 81, 81 (2006) (“One 
strategy involves redistributing schoolchildren; the other involves redistributing 
money. One focuses on race; the other focuses on resources. Despite these 
differences, both are united by a common purpose of improving educational 
opportunity for the most disadvantaged children—in particular, those who are 
minority and poor.”). 
 106. The idea of categorizing school finance litigation into “waves” originated 
with William Thro, a long-time education lawyer and legal scholar on school 
litigation. See William E. Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky 
and Texas Decisions on the Future of Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 19 J.L. & 
EDUC. 219, 222–32, 250 (1990). But see Koski, supra note 6, at 1188 (noting how the 
so-called “waves” are not actually such distinct categories). 
 107. Kamina Aliya Pinder, Reconciling Race-Neutral Strategies and Race-Conscious 
Objectives: The Potential Resurgence of the Structural Injunction in Education Litigation, 9 
STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 247, 256–57 (2013). 
 108. 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (finding that California’s school financing 
system “invidiously discriminates against the poor because it makes the quality of a 
child’s education a function of the wealth of his parents and neighbors”). 
 109. See Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A 
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1101 n.11 (1977) (citing nine decisions 
throughout the country between 1971 and 1973 that illustrated the success of the 
Serrano litigation strategy). 
 110. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973) 
(“[W]e continue to acknowledge that the Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise 
decisions with respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues.”); cf. Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Making Schools More Separate and Unequal: Parents Involved in 
19
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responded by linking school finance litigation to state constitutional 
provisions, something explicitly suggested by both Justice Marshall 
(in his Rodriguez dissent)111 and Justice Brennan (in a law review 
article).112 The “second wave” of litigation again focused on unequal 
spending between districts, but this time using “education clauses” 
and state constitutional principles.113 But the second wave included 
more losses than wins,114 and even the few victories produced rather 
mixed results, often leading to vague remedies overly deferential to 
noncompliant legislatures.115 In light of the losses and in response to 
the concerns about the lack of compliance by state legislatures, 
school finance cases began to wane in the 1980s116—but this was only 
a momentary pause.  
The “third wave” shifted focus to the “adequacy” of education, 
rather than the “equity” of funding, with one state court declaring 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 633, 634 
(2014) (“Rodriguez meant that [schools] would be unequal. American public 
education is characterized by wealthy, white suburban schools spending a great deal 
on education surrounding much poorer black and Latino city schools that spend 
much less on education.”). 
 111. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 133 n.100 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Of course, 
nothing in the Court’s decision today should inhibit further review of state 
educational funding schemes under state constitutional provisions.”). 
 112. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 495 n.38 (1977) (“Recent decisions have also given rise 
to some doubt as to the Court’s continuing commitment to the eradication of racial 
discrimination in . . . education.”). In this article, written shortly after Rodriguez, 
Justice Brennan wrote, “[t]he legal revolution which has brought federal law to the 
fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—
for without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.” Id. at 491. 
 113. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973) (finding the 
school finance system unconstitutional after determining that the State failed to 
“fulfill[] its obligation to afford all pupils that level of instructional opportunity 
which is comprehended by a thorough and efficient system of education for 
students,” as required under the state constitution). 
 114. Of the twenty-two meaningful opinions in school finance cases issued 
between 1973 and 1989, less than one-third were victories for plaintiffs. See Koski, 
supra note 6, at 1189 (collecting cases and observing that “[t]his round 
of . . . litigation proved mostly unsuccessful for plaintiffs”). 
 115. See Levin, supra note 109, at 1135 (describing the lengthy, repeated 
litigation in New Jersey and California trying to enforce school finance victories 
against reluctant and slow-moving state legislatures). 
 116. See Janet D. McDonald et al., School Finance Litigation and Adequacy Studies, 
27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 69, 75 (2004) (“[T]he general unwillingness of 
courts to find for the plaintiffs in these [second wave] cases encouraged litigants to 
move away from arguments based only on funding inequities.”). 
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the state’s entire education system unconstitutional.117 The 
Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Rose v. Council for Better 
Education, Inc. marks one of the largest historical interventions in 
education by a state court.118 As sweeping as its order striking down 
the entire education system was, the court went even further. The 
court provided the legislature with specific criteria on what would 
constitute an “efficient” system of common schools, including what 
competencies students should receive and what standards a 
constitutional school system must uphold.119 
The Rose decision paved the way for large successes in the “third 
wave” of school finance litigation, commonly known as “adequacy 
 117. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 215 (Ky. 1989) (“This 
decision applies to the entire sweep of the system—all its parts and parcels . . . the 
whole gamut of the common school system in Kentucky.”). Two other “adequacy” 
cases were decided the same year as Rose, adding to the sense that a new era of 
education reform litigation was underway. See Helena Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 
769 P.2d 684 (Mont. 1989); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 
(Tex. 1989); see also Gormley, supra note 9, at 216 (“In this trilogy of cases, and 
others that followed, the courts presumably jettisoned equality analyses under state 
constitutions in favor of an “adequacy” analysis in scrapping dysfunctional funding 
schemes for public education.”). 
 118. See Kern Alexander, The Common School Ideal and the Limits of Legislative 
Authority, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 341, 342 (1991) (“This ruling constituted one of the 
most comprehensive interventions by a state judiciary into the realm of legislative 
policymaking for education . . . invalidating 153 years of legislation and legislative 
autonomy.”). According to the court in Rose, “Kentucky’s educational effort” was 
both “inadequate and well below the national effort.” 790 S.W.2d at 197. 
119. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each 
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient 
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in 
a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of 
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make 
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental 
processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his 
or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and 
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient 
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her 
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation 
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to 
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) 
sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school 
students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding 
states, in academics or in the job market. 
Id. 
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cases.”120 Soon after the Rose decision, state courts in three more 
cases directed their legislatures to craft a remedial plan to comply 
with the criteria set forth in Rose.121 Litigating “adequacy” rather than 
“equity” shifted the focus of state court litigation from ensuring an 
equitable balance of resources to securing sufficient resources to 
provide every student an “adequate” education.122 This new focus 
resulted in many more successful outcomes for plaintiffs than the 
prior approach.123  Since Rose, plaintiffs have won about two-thirds 
of finance and adequacy cases.124  
State-based educational reform litigation (both finance and 
adequacy cases) has fallen short of improving system-wide 
 120. See McDonald et al., supra note 116, at 77 (collecting cases where 
“Kentucky’s definition of adequacy has been used directly or served as a substantive 
portion of the adequacy definition adopted in several other states”); see also 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 482 (N.Y. 2001) (listing states 
that used Rose to interpret their own education clauses). 
 121. See Koski, supra note 6, at 1273–74 (“Courts in Alabama, Massachusetts, and 
New Hampshire addressed the constitutionality of their educational finance systems 
for the first time and, citing the Rose decision, declared them unconstitutional under 
an adequacy theory. Each of those courts specifically relied on [Rose]’s definition of 
‘adequacy’ and sent the matter back to their legislatures to craft a remedial plan in 
accordance with that definition.”). 
 122. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997) (“[W]e must 
ensure that there is enough money that students have the chance to succeed 
because of the educational opportunity provided, not in spite of it. Such an 
opportunity requires, at the very least, that all of Ohio’s children attend schools 
which are safe and conducive to learning.”); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 667 (N.Y. 1995) (“We think it beyond cavil that the failure to 
provide the opportunity to obtain such fundamental skills as literacy and the ability 
to add, subtract and divide numbers would constitute a violation of the Education 
Article.”). 
 123. See Molly A. Hunter & Kathleen J. Gebhardt, Legal Precedent and the 
Opportunity for Educational Equity: Where to Now, Colorado?, 50 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 
894 (2016) (“Though defendant states often prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s in 
cases based on equal protection clauses and seeking equal per-pupil funding, 
plaintiffs’ success rate improved as they focused more on ensuring that schools had 
sufficient resources to educate all students, relying on state constitutional education 
articles.”). 
 124. From Rose until the early 1990s, plaintiffs won six of nine cases (66%) that 
reached a final state supreme court decision. Koski, supra note 6, at 1264. The 
jurisprudential distinction between adequacy and finance may be less clear. See 
Gormley, supra note 9, at 218 (“It is unhelpful and inaccurate to suggest that these 
cases can be segregated and packaged into neat ‘equality’ and ‘adequacy’ boxes. In 
fact, most state constitutional decisions in this area contain elements of both 
equality and adequacy themes.”). 
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achievement for students of color.125 First, school districts comprised 
primarily of students of color have not fared as well as mostly white 
districts in such litigation.126 They lost school finance cases more 
often than predominantly white districts.127 And even when 
segregated or diverse districts have won, they have faced far more 
legislative resistance to reform than predominantly white districts.128 
Second, students of color trapped in segregated schools do not 
always show increased student achievement even if their schools 
receive more money.129 Thus, while many segregated schools still 
lack sufficient resources, segregation cannot be fixed by money 
alone.130  
 125. See Michael Rebell et al., Many Schools are Still Inadequate, Now What?, EDUC.
NEXT (2009), http://educationnext.org/many-schools-are-still-inadequate-now-
what/ (last visited April 15, 2018) (“[A]verage black and Hispanic students [are] 
lagging three or four grade levels behind the average white student. . . . [B]lack 
students . . . have regressed compared to their peers nationally.”). 
 126. James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
432, 433 (1999) (“[M]inority school districts—particularly urban minority 
districts—do not fare as well as white districts in school finance litigation.”). 
 127.  See id. at 433 (reviewing cases and concluding that “minority districts do 
not win school finance cases nearly as often as white districts do. . . .”) 
 128. See id. (finding that “in the few states where minority districts have 
successfully challenged school finance schemes, they have encountered legislative 
recalcitrance that exceeds, in both intensity and duration, the legislative resistance 
that successful white districts have faced”); see also Garda, supra note 65, at 56 
(“[P]oor minority districts that most need additional funding are the least likely to 
obtain it through finance litigation.”). 
 129. See Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic 
Integration of the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1353 (2004). As Professor 
Molly McUsic has found, “[i]n school district after school district, large funding 
increases have proved inadequate to overcome the educational disadvantages faced 
by poor, underachieving students.” Id. See Eric A. Hanushek, When School Finance 
“Reform” May Not be Good Policy, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 423, 437–38 (1991) (discussing 
studies which conclude that there is “no strong or systematic relationship between 
school expenditures and student performance”). 
 130. See James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 256 (1999) 
(“Although it is possible that school finance reform could have been a helpful 
supplement to desegregation, it is a poor substitute. Despite the hopes of early 
school finance advocates, we should not expect school finance reform to solve the 
problems created by the failure to desegregate many urban schools.”). 
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C. State Law Segregation Claims 
1. Sheff
Efforts to improve educational outcomes for students of color 
through state courts took a step further with a case filed two months 
before the Rose decision was handed down.131 In Sheff v. O’Neill,132 
plaintiffs brought a hybrid case that combined previous adequacy 
cases with federal desegregation theories.133 Like previous school 
finance cases, Sheff relied on the state constitution (Connecticut) 
and the case was filed in state court—but, instead of seeking more 
equitable funding or more resources to improve education, Sheff 
challenged the segregation of Hartford’s schools.134 In Sheff, the 
plaintiffs alleged that “students in the Hartford public schools are 
burdened by severe educational disadvantages arising out of their 
racial and ethnic isolation and their socioeconomic deprivation.”135 
Importantly, unlike federal courts, the court in Sheff did not 
limit its inquiry to intentional conduct or school district 
 131. Rose was decided on June 8, 1989. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 
790 S.W.2d 186, 186 (Ky. 1989). Sheff was filed shortly before that on April 28, 1989. 
Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff 
v. O’Neill?, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 351, 353 (1996).
132. 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996).
133. See John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill Is a Landmark Decision, 30 CONN. 
L. REV. 211, 213–14 (1997) (explaining how Sheff blended school finance equity 
theory with a theory similar to traditional desegregation cases). Sheff also illustrates 
how funding is not enough to address school segregation. 678 A.2d at 1281. Twelve 
years before Sheff, the Connecticut Supreme Court struck down the state’s school 
funding structure in a traditional school finance case. See Horton v. Meskill, 376 
A.2d 359, 374–75 (Conn. 1977). As a result, Connecticut provided the most state aid 
to the Hartford schools, which were predominantly low-income and students of 
color. Liu, supra note 102, at 105. The effect was to make the inner city schools the 
highest funded in the region. Id. The court had specifically found that “[s]tate 
financial aid is distributed so that the neediest school districts receive the most aid.” 
Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1273. Despite additional funding, however, students in Hartford’s 
segregated schools did significantly worse than their suburban counterparts. See id. 
(noting that academic performance of Hartford students fell “significantly below 
that of schoolchildren from the twenty-one surrounding suburban towns”); see also 
McUsic, supra note 129, at 1353 (“Despite the millions of dollars in state resources 
spent on the Hartford, Connecticut schools, for example, students attending them 
have scored far below statewide and suburban test-score averages in every area 
tested, at every grade level in every year.”). 
134. 678 A.2d at 1271. 
135. Id. 
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boundaries.136 Rejecting the state’s argument that adequacy cases do 
not extend to issues other than a school’s funding,137 the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that “the existence of extreme 
racial and ethnic isolation in the public school system” violates the 
state constitution.138 Like Rose before it, Sheff demonstrated that “the 
underlying right recognized in school finance cases—the right to an 
adequate or equal education—need not be defined solely in 
monetary terms.”139 Under Sheff, educational adequacy required 
eliminating school segregation.140 
 136. Id. Importantly, unlike the federal cases in the Brown progeny, the issue of 
intent and the de jure / de facto distinction were not relevant. See id. at 1285 (“Racial 
and ethnic segregation has a pervasive and invidious impact on schools, whether 
the segregation results from intentional conduct or from unorchestrated 
demographic factors.”). The court made clear the legislature must “remedy 
segregation in our public schools, regardless of whether that segregation has 
occurred de jure or de facto.” Id. at 1283. 
 137. Id. at 1281. For the court in Sheff, the central issue was “whether the state 
has fully satisfied its affirmative constitutional obligation to provide a substantially 
equal educational opportunity if the state demonstrates that it has substantially 
equalized school funding and resources.” Id. 
 138. See id. (explaining that the requirement of educational adequacy under the 
state constitution “differs in kind from most constitutional obligations” in that it 
“explicitly require[s] the state to act rather than not to refrain from acting”). 
According to Sheff, Connecticut has an affirmative obligation under the state 
constitution to repair the racial isolation in Hartford’s public schools. See id. at 
1270–71 (“We hold today that the needy schoolchildren of Hartford have waited 
long enough. The constitutional imperatives . . . of our state constitution entitle the 
plaintiffs to relief.”). 
139. Ryan, supra note 105, at 532. 
 140. Unlike Rose, however, the court in Sheff failed to articulate any specific 
criteria to guide the legislature. After ruling that de facto segregation violated the 
state constitution, the court limited its relief to a declaratory judgment that the 
school districting and boundary drawing system was unconstitutional. Sheff, 678 A.2d 
at 1291. In “staying [its] hand,” the court issued only an admonishment to “the 
legislature and the executive branch to put the search for appropriate remedial 
measures at the top of their respective agendas.” Id. at 1290; see also James K. 
Gooch, Fenced In: Why Sheff v. O’Neill Can’t Save Connecticut’s Inner City Students, 22 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 395, 415 (2004) (criticizing the remedy in Sheff because it “did 
not offer detailed guidance as to what ‘appropriate measures’ might be, nor set a 
timetable for achieving improvement. Perhaps more immediately harmful was its 
failure to offer a standard by which improvement could be judged”). 
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2. Minnesota Cases
Two Minnesota cases have followed Sheff’s lead, using state 
constitutional principles to challenge school segregation.141 In 
Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. Minnesota, filed shortly before the 
Sheff decision and based on the Sheff complaint,142 plaintiffs argued 
that racial and socioeconomic segregation in Minneapolis schools 
violated the Minnesota Constitution’s education and equal 
protection clauses.143 Two years prior, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had determined that the state’s education clause created a 
fundamental right to education.144   
The Minneapolis NAACP case withstood two separate motions to 
dismiss and a certified question to the state supreme court.145 After 
 141. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017); 
Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP. v. Minnesota, No. 95–14800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Sept. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Minneapolis NAACP Complaint]. 
 142. See Margaret C. Hobday et al., A Missed Opportunity: Minnesota’s Failed 
Experiment with Choice-based Integration, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 956 n.124 
(2009) (“The litigation was, in large part, modeled after the ongoing litigation in 
Connecticut, Sheff v. O’Neill.”); see also Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and 
Metropolitan Integration: the Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 L. & 
INEQ. 269, 311 (2006) (noting that Sheff was argued in the state supreme court just 
nine days after the filing of the Minneapolis NAACP Complaint). 
 143. Minneapolis NAACP Complaint. The suit also brought claims of housing 
segregation, which were dismissed because of potential interference with an existing 
consent decree for desegregating public housing. NAACP, Minneapolis Branch v. 
Metro. Council, 125 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1997), vacated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), aff’d 
on reh’g, 144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 144. Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993). In Skeen, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of the state constitution. See id. at 
309–10. After analyzing the text of the constitution, the court reasoned: “[W]e hold 
that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because 
of its overall importance to the state but also because of the explicit language used 
to describe this constitutional mandate. While a fundamental right cannot be found 
“[a]bsent constitutional mandate,” the Education Clause is a mandate, not simply a 
grant of power.” Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 1, 31(1973)). See Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (declaring 
Connecticut’s constitution to contain a fundamental right to education). 
 145. Orfield, supra note 142, at 312–13 (“The district court judge, after hearing 
arguments in April 1996, ordered several defendants dismissed but allowed the case 
to go forward. The district court also determined that the issues raised in the case 
were sufficiently novel and important enough to be decided directly by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court. The higher court refused to hear the certified questions, 
and the defendants subsequently sought unsuccessfully to have the case dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds.”). 
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multiple attempts at mediation, the case finally settled in 2000, 
nearly five years after being filed.146 Though small in scope and scale, 
the settlement has largely been viewed as a success, albeit a limited 
one.147 The settlement established a four-year experimental program 
that provided students living in the most racially isolated 
neighborhoods in Minneapolis with free transportation as well as 
guaranteed seats in successful suburban schools and the highest 
performing magnet schools in Minneapolis.148 The legislature voted 
to continue the program after the four-year settlement expired,149 
and a version of the program still exists today.150 
In 2015, a second lawsuit was filed in Minnesota challenging 
racial and socioeconomic segregation under the state 
constitution.151 In Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota, the plaintiffs 
alleged again that segregated schools deny schoolchildren their 
right to receive an adequate education under their state 
constitution.152 The complaint and legal theories are nearly the same 
 146. See generally Settlement Agreement, Minneapolis Branch of the NAACP v. 
State (undated) [hereinafter Minneapolis NAACP Settlement] at 1–7 (on file with 
authors). 
 147. See Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1587 (“The program, though small, has 
been seen as a success.”); Orfield, supra note 142, at 315–18 (detailing the positive 
aspects of the settlement, including the growth of the program, the survey results of 
participating parents, and the desegregating impact on suburban districts along 
with poorly executed aspects, such as the “poor publicity” of different features and 
underutilization by intended benefactors). 
 148. Minneapolis NAACP Settlement, supra note 146, at 2. At the end of the four 
years, the plaintiffs were free to reinstitute their lawsuit if sufficient progress had 
not been made. Id. at 3–4. 
149. Kahlenberg, supra note 62, at 1587. 
 150. See Isaac Peterson, One Desegregation Lawsuit Not Enough, MINNESOTA
SPOKESMAN-RECORDER (June 28, 2015) (quoting Dan Shulman, lead attorney in the 
Minneapolis NAACP case, stating “[t]o one degree or another [The Choice is Yours 
Plan] still exists”). 
151. Class Action Complaint, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2017) (No. 27-CV-15-19117) [hereinafter “Cruz-Guzman Complaint”]. The 
complaint specifically alleges that students in Minneapolis and St. Paul public 
schools are segregated by race and class in violation of the Minnesota Constitution. 
Id. ¶ 2; see also Quick Facts about the Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota Educational 
Adequacy Case, http://www.gpmlaw.com/portalresource/Cruz-Guzman_quick-
facts.pdf [hereinafter “Quick Facts about Cruz-Guzman”]. The plaintiffs also include 
One Family One Community, a Minnesota nonprofit organization. Cruz-Guzman 
Complaint ¶ 14. 
 152. The complaint alleges that a segregated education is per se an inadequate 
education under the Minnesota Constitution. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 
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as the Minneapolis NAACP case in the 1990s.153 In 2015, however, the 
conditions in Minneapolis schools were arguably worse than the 
conditions giving rise to the previous case.154 Segregation had 
become more intense, with far more highly segregated schools than 
in 1995.155 At the time of the Cruz-Guzman complaint, there were 
thirty-six public schools in Minneapolis and St. Paul combined 
containing 90% or more students of color.156 Segregation had also 
spread into suburban districts, where at least thirty-four schools in 
fourteen districts were less than one-third white.157 Students of color 
had proficiency rates in reading, math, and science at less than one-
third the proficiency rates of white students.158  
On July 8, 2016, the district court denied the main parts of 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.159 Importantly, the court 
151, ¶ 69. The complaint also alleges that the State of Minnesota is strictly liable for 
this deprivation of Plaintiffs’ fundamental right to an adequate education. Id. ¶ 74. 
 153. Plaintiffs’ counsel makes clear that Cruz-Guzman is basically the same case 
as Minneapolis NAACP. See Peterson, supra note 150 (quoting the lead attorney, 
“[e]ssentially, you could say it’s the son of the previous case; it’s the same case. Of 
course, there will be different plaintiffs, but it will assert many of the same 
violations.”). There is even a significant overlap in the roster of lawyers representing 
the plaintiffs. See Quick Facts about Cruz-Guzman, supra note 151, at 1 (explaining 
that the current lawyers comprise “three attorneys [who] represented the plaintiffs 
in the [Minneapolis NAACP] educational adequacy litigation in the 1990s”). Unlike 
Minneapolis NAACP, however, Cruz-Guzman has expanded its coverage to both 
Minneapolis and St. Paul. See Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 151, ¶ 2 (“The 
Minneapolis Public Schools have been in the past and currently are segregated on 
the basis of both race and socioeconomic status, such that members of the plaintiff 
class attend schools the enrollment of which is disproportionately comprised of 
minority students and students living in poverty, as compared with neighboring and 
surrounding suburban school districts.”). 
 154. See Peterson, supra note 150 (quoting the lead plaintiff’s attorney 
explaining that “[t]he same conditions that existed when we filed the first case in 
1995 have reoccurred almost 20 years later. And they’re worse”). 
155. Id. 
 156. Cruz-Guzman Complaint, supra note 151, ¶¶ 23, 25. Such a high number of 
racially isolated schools is remarkable in a state that is less than 30% students of 
color. Id. ¶ 21. 
157. Id. ¶ 51. 
158. Id. ¶ 36. Disparities in science proficiency were particularly stark. In 
Minneapolis, the ratio of white student proficiency to African American student 
proficiency in science was 71.1% to 12.5%. In St. Paul, the ratio is 64.2% to 14%. Id. 
 159. The court was relying on a previous Minnesota case that established 
education as a fundamental right and “cited with approval” Rose and its progeny. See 
Order Den. Mot. to Dismiss, Cruz-Guzman v. State of Minnesota, July 8, 2016, at 14 
(“[T]he Skeen court cited with approval several cases from other states that 
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acknowledged the link between Cruz-Guzman and the previous 
adequacy cases that established that education clauses contain a 
“qualitative standard.”160 On March 13, 2017, however, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s decision, 
deeming the plaintiffs’ claims a nonjusticiable political question.161 
On April 26, 2017, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the 
dismissal order and granted review.162 Notably, amici curiae were filed 
by eleven local and twenty-one national education and constitutional 
scholars, unanimously arguing for overturning the Court of Appeals 
decision.163 
IV. BACKGROUND ON JUSTICIABILITY
The 2017 dismissal of Minnesota’s Cruz-Guzman case was not the 
first time that state educational adequacy claims have found 
themselves obstructed by justiciability principles.164 Several other 
adequacy cases have been dismissed at least superficially on similar 
grounds, leading to concern among some scholars that courts are 
beginning to doubt their role as the guarantors of a constitutionally 
sufficient education.165 
recognized a qualitative educational standard within their respective constitutions.” 
(citing Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 310–12 (Minn. 1993))) (on file with 
authors). 
160. Id. 
 161. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017), review 
granted, Cruz-Guzman v. State, No. A16-1265, 2017 Minn. LEXIS 236 (Apr. 26, 2017) 
(reversing the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss because Cruz-
Guzman’s claims present a nonjusticiable political question). 
162. Id.; Beena Raghavendran, Minnesota Supreme Court to Take Up School 
Integration Lawsuit, STAR TRIB., Apr. 27, 2017, at B2. 
 163. See, e.g., Br. of Amici Curiae Educ. Law Ctr. and the Constitutional & Educ. 
Law Scholars in Support of Pl.’s-Pet’rs [hereinafter ELC Brief] and Br. of Amici 
Curiae Concerned Law Professors [hereinafter CLP Brief] (both filed June 2, 2017) 
(briefs on file with authors). Both briefs assert that the Court of Appeals “deviated 
from this significant body of case law” in a fashion that is “inconsistent with 
principles of justiciability” as commonly applied across numerous adequacy cases 
from across the country. ELC Brief, at 10–11; CLP Brief, at 15 n.5. 
 164. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 83 (describing how justiciability 
and “separation of powers concerns have begun to drive state courts out of this 
important avenue of education reform”). 
 165. Some state courts have ruled that educational adequacy cases are 
nonjusticiable, particularly where judges are “concerned about their institutional 
competence to deal with the questions presented.” Id. at 118. 
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A. Basic Principles and Federal Law 
Political question justiciability is a concept that is sometimes 
easier to grasp in the abstract than in application. The United States 
Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he nonjusticiability of a political 
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers,” 
implying that the doctrine arises from the intent of the U.S. 
Constitution to adjudicate certain matters through the operation of 
the political system rather than through litigation in the courts.166 
The reality of the doctrine is less straightforward, and appears to 
raise questions of the courts’ expertise as well as their intended role 
in the constitutional scheme.167 
The most elaborate clarification of political question 
justiciability arose in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Baker v. Carr,168 
which created a six-part test to evaluate whether a case involves a 
political question. In order to be deemed nonjusticiable, a case must 
involve one of the following: 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the  issue to a coordinate political department; or  
[2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; or  
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or  
[4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government; or  
[5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or  
[6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on one 
question.169 
The Court set a high bar for nonjusticiability, clarifying that 
“[u]nless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at 
166. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 167. See Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 97 (noting the challenges of the 
justiciability doctrine by analyzing judicial competence). 
168. 369 U.S. 186. 
169. Id. at 217. A number of adequacy cases have applied the Baker test. See infra 
notes 191–195 and accompanying text (explaining how the majority of adequacy 
cases have found claims justiciable). 
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bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground 
of a political question’s presence.”170 Courts may not reject “bona 
fide” lawsuits just because there is a question “as to whether some 
action denominated ‘political’ exceeds constitutional authority.”171  
The Supreme Court has long held that courts have the authority 
to interpret what the law means and review whether government 
actors have complied with the law, particularly when protecting 
constitutional rights.172 For the Court, “injury to a legally protected 
right” is the “touchstone to justiciability.”173 In fact, access to the 
courts to preserve rights and remedy violations has been a 
foundation of our legal system dating back to English common 
law.174
The federal political question doctrine, as a limitation on these 
principles, has been subject to debate and criticism by leading 
scholars.175 A major critique of the political question doctrine is that 
170. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (emphasis added). 
171. Id. 
172. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“[W]here 
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever 
that right is invaded.”). The Supreme Court has recognized, since its beginning, 
that courts not only have the power to decide whether a constitutional right has 
been violated but that it is “the very essence of judicial duty” to do so. Id. at 
178–79; Londonderry Sch. Dist. SAU No. 12 v. State, 907 A.2d 988, 996 (N.H. 2006) 
(“[T]he judiciary has a responsibility to ensure that constitutional rights not be 
hollowed out and, in the absence of action by other branches, a judicial remedy is 
not only appropriate but essential.”). 
 173. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 140 (1950) 
(plurality opinion). 
 174. As far back as the seventeenth century, English law recognized the right of 
individuals who had no personal stake in the outcome to obtain a writ of 
prohibition. Couey v. Atkins, 355 P.3d 866, 878, 902 (Or. 2015) (citing EDWARD
COKE, 2 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 602 (1797)). In a similar vein, the court 
in Couey also cited Blackstone, who noted the existence of “popular actions,” which 
could be brought by any person. Id. at 887 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 161 (1803)). As for early American courts, 
the court recalled that nineteenth-century caselaw widely recognized that 
individuals with no particular personal interest could bring actions to vindicate 
public rights. Id. at 888. 
 175. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99 (1987) 
(arguing that the political question doctrine is “inconsistent with the most 
fundamental purpose of the Constitution: safeguarding matters from majority 
rule”); Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the ‘Political Question,’ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 
1031, 1059–60 (1984) (criticizing the political question doctrine because it allows 
other branches of the federal government to violate constitutional provisions 
without the check of judicial review). 
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the Baker criteria “seem useless in identifying what constitutes a 
political question.”176 Notwithstanding ample litigation, the United 
States Supreme Court has rarely found that a political question bars 
its adjudication of an issue.177 As one state supreme court observed, 
the Supreme Court did not even discuss the doctrine in Bush v. Palm 
Beach County Canvassing Board178 or Bush v. Gore,179 which involved 
the 2000 national presidential election and certainly raised “a 
‘political issue’ as conventionally understood. . . .”180  
B. Justiciability in State Courts 
State courts, of course, are free to establish their own rules of 
justiciability.181 The United States Supreme Court has been clear that 
federal justiciability rules bind only federal courts, leaving state 
courts to develop their own justiciability doctrines.182 State courts 
must consider their own “special needs of state and local 
governance” in configuring their state justiciability doctrine, rather 
176. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 153 (6th ed. 2012). 
 177. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political 
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267–68 
(2002) (“In fact, in the almost forty years since Baker v. Carr was decided, a majority 
of the Court has found only two issues to present political questions, and both 
involved strong textual anchors for finding that the constitutional decision rested 
with the political branches.”). 
178. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
179. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
180. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 780 
(Tex. 2005). As the court observed, the U.S. Supreme Court “has held only two 
issues to be nonjusticiable political questions. . . . [The Court] did not hold the one-
man-one-vote congressional apportionment issue in Baker v. Carr to be a political 
question, and it has refused to hold issues to be political questions in at least seven 
other cases.” Id. at 779. 
 181. Brennan, supra note 112, at 493. Justice Brennan, who authored Baker, 
declared that “state courts that rest their decisions wholly or even partly on state law 
need not apply federal principles of standing and justiciability that deny litigants 
access to the courts.” Id. at 501. 
 182. See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“[T]he constraints 
of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not 
bound by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of 
justiciability.”); N.Y. State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 8 n.2 
(1988) (“[T]he special limitations that Article III of the Constitution imposes on 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts are not binding on the state courts. The States 
are thus left free . . . to determine matters that would not satisfy the more stringent 
requirement in the federal courts that an actual ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ be presented 
for resolution.” (citation omitted)). 
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than confining their assessments to federal constraints.183 The 
federal political question doctrine has limited value for state courts, 
where “there are hardly any state analogues to the self-imposed 
constraints on justiciability, ‘political questions,’ and the like.”184 
There are significant differences between the separation of powers 
under state constitutions compared to those under the U.S. 
Constitution.185  
One important distinction between state and federal 
constitutions is the inherent remedial role of state courts. This is due 
to the different nature of the rights accorded in state constitutions 
and the United States Constitution.186 The United States 
 183. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1905 (2001). As Professor Hershkoff has stated, 
state constitutions “do not reflect the same level of trust in state legislative decision-
making as does the [F]ederal Constitution in congressional decision-making.” Id. at 
1891–92. “Article I of the Constitution assumes that Congress is best situated to 
decide how to carry out the terms of its authority. . . . State constitutions, in contrast, 
impose not only substantive, but also procedural requirements on legislative 
activity.” Id. at 1892. “[S]uch provisions alter the dynamics of lawmaking, 
implicating the state courts in the resolution of certain governance questions that 
are largely outside the Article III experience.” Id. at 1893. In some states, the courts 
have not applied any limitations under the political question doctrine. See, e.g., 
Backman v. Sec’y of the Commonwealth, 441 N.E.2d 523, 527 (Mass. 1982) (“[W]e 
have never explicitly incorporated the [political question] doctrine into our State 
jurisprudence, [because] . . . this court has an obligation to adjudicate claims that 
particular actions conflict with constitutional requirements.”). 
 184. Hans A. Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 
(1972). 
 185. See Christine M. Durham, The Judicial Branch in State Government: Parables of 
Law, Politics, and Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1601, 1603 (2001) (“State constitutions 
have a tradition independent of federal law in the allocation of power among the 
branches of state government and in their development and understanding of 
republican principles.”); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: 
Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1558 (1997) (“State courts 
regularly are called upon to enforce state constitutional obligations that, for sound 
reasons of federalism, federal courts have declined to enforce.”). As the Supreme 
Court explained long ago, “[w]hether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers 
of a state shall be kept altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or 
collections of persons belonging to one department may, in respect to some 
matters, exert powers which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of 
government, is for the determination of the state.” Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 
(1902). 
 186. See Gary S. Gildin, Redressing Deprivations of Rights Secured by State 
Constitutions Outside the Shadow of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Remedies 
Jurisprudence, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 877, 881–83 (2011) (“Just as state courts may 
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Constitution mostly grants “negative” rights—those rights upon 
which the government may not infringe.187 If a court finds an 
infringement of a negative right, the remedy is most likely limited to 
stopping the infringement by prohibiting and perhaps even 
punishing the action.188 The difference in the inherent remedial 
power of state courts arises because all state constitutions also grant 
“positive” rights, including rights that entitle individuals to benefits 
or actions by the state.189 In contrast to protecting “negative” rights, 
preventing government action represents the greatest threat to 
“positive” rights.190   
C. Application to Educational Adequacy Lawsuits 
As discussed above, several educational adequacy claims have 
been defeated on justiciability grounds.191 However, a simple tally 
shows that these decisions do not, at least not so far, represent a sea 
change in state education law. The “clear majority” of state courts, 
when addressing adequacy claims, have ruled in favor of 
legitimately find rights to be guaranteed by state constitutions where the United 
States Supreme Court has refused to protect the right under the 
federal Constitution, state courts are free to adopt a remedial scheme that more 
generously compensates the rights-holder. . . .”). 
 187. See Richard E. Levy, Gunfight at the K-12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power 
in the Kansas School Finance Litigation, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1021, 1024–34 (2006) (“Most 
constitutional rights are ‘negative’ rights in the sense that they prohibit the 
government from taking action that interferes with a right that the individual 
already has.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317–18 (1980) (“Although the 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection against unwarranted 
government interference with freedom of choice in the context of certain personal 
decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to 
realize all the advantages of that freedom.”). 
 189. See Hershkoff, supra note 183, at 1889–90 (“Such provisions shift the 
inertial bias associated with the federal government: if negative rights under the 
[F]ederal Constitution restrain government action, positive rights under state 
constitutions mandate such action.”). 
 190. See Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and Judicial Review of Positive 
Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 
1057, 1089 (1993) (“[W]hen positive rights are at issue legislative action represents 
the good and legislative inertia the evil.”). Indeed, “legislative action satisfying a 
constitutional obligation is extremely unlikely unless judicial rulings call for such 
action.” Id. 
 191. See supra Part III.B; see also Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 95–98 
(discussing education litigation and justiciability). 
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justiciability.192 Dozens of state high courts have affirmed their 
judiciary’s role in vindicating constitutional education guarantees to 
children.193 In most adequacy cases when defendants raise 
justiciability arguments, “the courts reject them out of hand.”194 
According to one recent study, out of twenty-nine different state 
educational adequacy cases since 1989, only “seven states . . . have 
held for defendants at the basic liability stage in sound basic 
education.”195 Before 1989, every court to which defendants 
presented this “political question” argument patently rejected it.196 
Courts have found justiciability particularly appropriate given 
the constitutional nature of education adequacy claims.197 In 
adequacy claims, courts have the “final obligation to guard, enforce, 
and protect” their states’ constitutional education requirements.198 
 192. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (“[A] clear majority of 
[state courts] have ruled in favor of justiciability. . . .”). 
 193. See ELC BRIEF, supra note 163, at 8 (collecting cases where state high courts 
have held that lawsuits challenging whether education has been provided in 
accordance with a constitutionally enshrined standard are justiciable). 
194. REBELL, supra note 1, at 23. 
195. Id. at 22–23. 
196. Allen W. Hubsch, Education and Self-Government: The Right to Education Under 
State Constitutional Law, 18 J.L. & EDUC. 93, 115–16 (1989); see also McDaniel v. 
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 157 (Ga. 1981) (“Indeed, ‘[w]e know of no sister State 
which has refused merits treatment to such issues, and we would regard our own 
refusal to adjudicate plaintiffs’ claim of constitutional infringement an abdication 
of our constitutional duties.’” (quoting Bd. of Educ., Levittown v. Nyquist, 443 
N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981))); see also Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 
P.2d 71, 87 (Wash. 1978) (concluding that “the judiciary has the ultimate power 
and the duty to interpret, construe and give meaning to words, sections and articles 
of the constitution” because “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is”). 
 197. The Kentucky Supreme Court summarized this widely adopted rule aptly: 
“Courts may, should, and have involved themselves in defining the standards of a 
constitutionally mandated educational system.” Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 
Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989). 
 198. Columbia Falls Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 261 (Mont. 
2005) (“As the final guardian and protector of the right to education, it is 
incumbent upon the court to assure that the system enacted by the Legislature 
enforces, protects and fulfills the right.”). See Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 371–72 
(Colo. 2009) (holding “the court has the responsibility to review whether the actions 
of the legislature are consistent with its obligation to provide a thorough and 
uniform public school system”); Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 
850 P.2d 724, 734 (Idaho 1993) (declining “to accept the respondents’ argument 
that the other branches of government be allowed to interpret the constitution for 
us”). 
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To find otherwise “would be a complete abrogation of judicial 
responsibility” and would do a “severe disservice to the people.”199 
Courts carrying out this judicial responsibility is the only way to 
ensure that “the Legislature . . . fulfill[s] [its] constitutional 
mandate” to provide a sound education.200  
As the court in Rose explained: 
The judiciary has the ultimate power, and the duty, to 
apply, interpret, define, construe all words, phrases, 
sentences and sections of the Kentucky Constitution as 
necessitated by the controversies before it. It is solely the 
function of the judiciary to so do. This duty must be 
exercised even when such action serves as a check on the 
activities of another branch of government or when the 
court’s view of the constitution is contrary to that of other 
branches, or even that of the public.201 
Under the basic principle of the separation of powers for the 
Kentucky Supreme Court, “[t]o allow the General Assembly . . . to 
decide whether its [own] actions are constitutional is literally 
unthinkable.”202 When the “question becomes whether the 
legislature has actually performed its duty” under an education 
clause, it “is left to the courts to answer.”203 It is exclusively the courts’ 
responsibility to do so.204 
D. When Have Adequacy Claims Been Found Nonjusticiable? 
While the majority of state courts have firmly rejected the idea 
that educational adequacy lawsuits are nonjusticiable,205 it is also 
worthwhile to explore cases found nonjusticiable. Doing so reveals 
that these decisions are not merely an instance of courts diverging 
on identical questions. Instead, in many cases, important substantive 
199. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Ark. 2002). 
200. Hussein v. State, 973 N.E.2d 752, 754 (N.Y. 2012). 
201. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989). 
202. Id. 
203. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1226 (Kan. 2014). 
204. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) (“We will not dodge our 
responsibility by asserting that this case involves a nonjusticiable political question. 
To do so is unthinkable.”). 
 205. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1219 (Kan. 2014) (noting that a “clear 
majority” of other state courts have ruled in favor of justiciability). 
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differences in law, legislative history, or constitutional language can 
account for seemingly divergent outcomes between states.206 
Each of the clear minority of cases that have held adequacy 
claims nonjusticiable occurred in a state that has not deemed 
education a fundamental right.207 As discussed below, of those seven 
cases, only five states rely on justiciability in their dismissals, and only 
four rely upon the Baker v. Carr political question doctrine.208 By 
contrast, twenty-two state supreme courts have held that their 
respective education clauses produce justiciable claims.209  
1. Nebraska
In 2007, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed that school 
funding claims based on the state education clause were 
nonjusticiable.210 The court had not yet addressed whether the state 
education clause created a fundamental right to education.211 
Moreover, the language of the education clause is from the 
“establishment only” end of the spectrum and particularly weak.212 
The clause only states that “it shall be the duty of the Legislature to 
pass suitable laws . . . to encourage schools and the means of 
instruction.”213 But perhaps most importantly, the court determined 
that the history of the state constitution strongly supported 
legislative control of school funding and counseled against the 
recognition of a fundamental right to education.214 Not only had a 
1972 revision to the state constitution eliminated a provision 
requiring an equitable distribution of funds, but in 1996, voters 
 206. See supra Part III.C (discussing cases which have held that educational 
adequacy lawsuits are nonjusticiable). 
 207. See supra note 40 (listing states in which education is deemed a fundamental 
right). There is now one notable exception: the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
decision in Cruz-Guzman. 
 208. See infra Part III Sections D.1–D.6. The seventh case is the Minnesota Court 
of Appeals decision in Cruz-Guzman. 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
209. CLP Brief, supra note 163, at 11. 
 210. Neb. Coal. For Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d 164 
(Neb. 2007). 
211. But cf. Citizens of Decatur for Equal Educ. v. Lyons-Decatur-Lyons Sch. 
Dist., 739 N.W.2d 742 (Neb. 2007) (holding that the Free Instruction Clause of 
Nebraska’s state Constitution does not provide a fundamental right to equal and 
adequate funding of schools). 
212. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d at 170. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 179–80. 
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rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would explicitly 
have made education a fundamental right.215  
2. Oklahoma
In 2007, the Oklahoma Supreme Court also held that a series of 
school funding claims posed nonjusticiable political questions.216 
Here, too, the court was asked to rule on significantly weaker 
constitutional provisions.217 The Oklahoma Constitution provides 
that: “[p]rovisions shall be made for the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of public schools, which shall be open to all 
the children of the state and free from sectarian control. . . .”218 As 
in Nebraska, there had been no previous recognition of a 
fundamental right to education.219 Instead, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court had previously held “the Legislature has few constitutional 
restraints in carrying out its duty to establish and maintain a free 
educational public system.”220 
3. Pennsylvania
In 1999, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided the narrow 
question of whether claims against the state school funding system 
were improperly dismissed as political questions.221 The 
Pennsylvania judiciary had already held that the state’s education 
clause created no fundamental right, or individual right, of any 
kind.222 The court held that a constitutional provision requiring the 
legislature to “provide for the maintenance of a thorough and 
efficient system of public schools” was nonjusticiable.223 While its 
constitutional language is considered in the middle range 
category,224 the Minnesota Supreme Court felt that Pennsylvania’s 
215. Id. at 180–81. 
216. Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State, 158 P.3d 1058 (Okla. 2007). 
217. Id. 
218. OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 5. 
219. Okla. Educ. Ass’n, 158 P.3d at 1065–66. 
220. Id. 
221. Marrero ex rel. Tabalas v. Commonwealth, 739 A.2d 110, 113 (Pa. 1999). 
222. Id. at 112. 
223. Id. at 112–13. 
224. See supra notes 30–35 and accompanying text (explaining how education 
provisions in state constitutions are categorized). 
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language was weaker than the “general and uniform” language 
found in the Minnesota Education Clause.225 
4. Indiana
In Bonner v. Daniels, the plaintiffs challenged the state’s school 
finance system by seeking “a declaratory judgment to establish that 
the Indiana Constitution imposes an enforceable duty on the state 
government to provide a standard of quality education to public 
school students.”226 While these claims were dismissed, the court did 
not rely on justiciability grounds.227 Instead, the court analyzed the 
history and language of the state education clause, and determined 
it was not intended to impose affirmative duties on the legislature.228 
The Bonner plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief, arguing 
education was a fundamental right.229 After brief analysis, the court 
held their claim lacked merit because the Indiana Constitution did 
not expressly grant a “right or entitlement to education.”230   
 225. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993) (“Thus, a clear 
reading of the original constitution indicates that the drafters intended to draw a 
distinction between the fundamental right to a ‘general and uniform system of 
education’ and the financing of the education system, which merely must be 
‘thorough and efficient.’”). 
 226. Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 518 (Ind. 2009) 
(claiming additionally that the state government did not meet its duty to provide a 
standard of quality education). 
 227. Id. at 525 (Rucker, J., dissenting) (explaining the plaintiffs simply seek a 
declaration that the education they receive falls short of the constitutional mandate 
of providing a uniform system of open schools and stating “to say in effect that 
plaintiffs have not presented a justiciable issue is simply wrong in my view”). 
 228. Id. at 521 (“As can be seen from the text of the Education Clause, its 
language speaks only of a general duty to provide for a system of common schools 
and does not require the attainment of any standard of resulting educational 
quality.”); see King v. State, 818 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Iowa 2012) (holding that Iowa’s 
education clause does not mandate free public schools, or require the public 
education system of Iowa to be “adequate, efficient, quality, thorough, or uniform”). 
229. 907 N.E.2d at 519. 
 230. Id. at 522 (“[T]he drafters of our Constitution did not include any 
reference to education in Article 1 of the Bill of Rights, which declares the rights of 
individuals in relation to government. Education is not among the enumerated 
individual rights.”). 
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5. Iowa
A recent Iowa Supreme Court decision affirmed the dismissal of 
a constitutional challenge to schools.231 The case, however, leaves 
open the possibility that future constitutional challenges to public 
education programs are justiciable.232 The plaintiffs brought suit 
seeking a declaration that education is a fundamental right.233 The 
plaintiffs also alleged the Iowa state government violated the state 
education clause by failing to establish or enforce standards, failing 
to adopt effective educator pay systems, and failing to “establish and 
maintain an adequate education delivery system.”234 In doing so, 
they relied upon the opening clause of the “perpetual support fund” 
provision of the Iowa Constitution.235 The clause only indirectly 
invoked school characteristics by stating “[t]he general assembly 
shall encourage, by all suitable means, the promotion of intellectual, 
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”236  
The district court dismissed these claims as involving a 
nonjusticiable political question.237 On appeal, however, the 
supreme court expressly avoided deciding both the question of 
justiciability and whether education constituted a fundamental 
right—although it did reaffirm that “students have a due process 
right to an adequate education. . . .”238 The court nonetheless 
affirmed dismissal, holding the plaintiffs’ “specific challenges to the 
educational policies of this state” were inadequate.239 But, crucially, 
the court noted that its decision “does not foreclose future 
constitutional challenges . . . in the vital field of public education.”240 
6. Illinois
The Illinois Education Clause states “[t]he State shall provide 
for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions 
231. King, 818 N.W.2d at 4. 
232. Id. 
233. Id. at 5–6. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 12. 
236. IOWA CONST. art. IX, pt. 2, § 3. 
237. King, 818 N.W.2d at 5, 10. 
238. Id. at 22, 25–27. 
239. Id. at 5 (explaining challenges to the state’s educational policies should be 
brought to the plaintiffs’ elected representatives, rather than the court). 
240. Id. 
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and services.”241 This was used as the basis for two school funding 
claims in 1996: one premised on a failure to satisfy the legislative 
duty created by the clause, and another founded on an equal 
protection claim that the funding system impinged upon a 
fundamental right.242 The Illinois court first held that claims under 
the state education clause were political questions “outside the 
sphere of judicial function.”243 But the court did not resolve the 
equal protection component using the political question doctrine.244 
Instead, the court determined that there was no fundamental right 
to education in Illinois and thus the equal protection claims should 
be resolved with a “rational basis review.”245 A second decision in 
1999 reaffirmed these holdings.246  
V. ARE STATE LAW SEGREGATION CLAIMS JUSTICIABLE? 
Typically, when questions of justiciability are raised, educational 
adequacy claims are evaluated generically. That is to say, courts have 
decided the question without considering the underlying allegation 
of harm.  
Likewise, in the one instance of a Minnesota state law 
segregation claim being dismissed on justiciability grounds—the 
appellate ruling on the Minnesota Cruz-Guzman case—the claim was 
evaluated generically, by applying the Baker v. Carr factors.247 The 
plaintiffs in that case were described as seeking “an education of a 
241. ILL. CONST. art. X § 1. 
242. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1193, 1208 (Ill. 1996). 
243. Id. at 1193. 
244. Id. at 1203. 
245. Id. at 1195. 
246. Lewis v. Spagnolo, 710 N.E.2d 798, 804–05 (Ill. 1999) (affirming dismissal 
of an education clause claim when recognition of such a claim “would require the 
judiciary to ascertain from the constitution alone the content of an ‘adequate’ 
education”). When confronted with nearly identical questions in Skeen, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court took the opposite course. Rather than dismissing 
education clause claims as nonjusticiable, the court determined that the language 
of the clause created a substantive adequacy requirement, but not a blanket 
uniformity requirement. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Minn. 1993). 
When asked to recognize a fundamental right to education for the purposes of 
equal protection claims, the court unambiguously did so, though it did not apply 
that right to the facts before it. Id. at 315. 
247. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017). 
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certain quality.”248 Indeed, beyond a single footnote, neither race 
nor segregation was mentioned once in the court’s analysis.249 
The weight of the evidence suggests that, using the Baker v. Carr 
factors, adequacy suits should be justiciable regardless of their 
factual claims.250 However, there is no reason a court’s inquiry into 
the justiciability of an education clause claim must be neutral to the 
underlying harms or allegations.251 It is plausible that certain types 
of adequacy claims could be more justiciable than others—that is, 
that some kinds of harms are especially appropriate for judicial 
resolution.252  
Segregation claims are likely to be one such category. In the case 
of segregation claims, the robust body of preexisting law, the 
practical experience of courts in resolving similar claims, and the 
invocation of profoundly important and clearly defined 
constitutional rights all counsel in favor of justiciability.253 
A. Applying Baker v. Carr to State Law Segregation Claims 
The United States Supreme Court has assessed that the Baker 
factors “are probably listed in descending order of both importance 
and certainty.”254 When courts apply the Baker test in educational 
adequacy cases, the most frequently relevant factors are the first 
three: (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
248. See id. at 535. 
249. Id. 
250. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School 
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1208 (2011) (“The vast majority of courts 
have rejected state defendants’ non-justiciability arguments, reasoning that to 
decline to address plaintiffs’ challenges would amount to an abdication of the 
court’s essential responsibility to interpret the meaning of the state constitution.”); 
see also Christine M. O’Neill, Closing the Door on Positive Rights: State Court Use of the 
Political Question Doctrine to Deny Access to Educational Adequacy Claims, 42 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 545, 585 (2009) ( “[S]tate courts must stop using the federal political 
question doctrine to abdicate their responsibility to children”). 
 251. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of 
Educational Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 
701, 707 (2010). 
 252. See Jared S. Buszin, Beyond School Finance: Refocusing Education Reform 
Litigation to Realize the Deferred Dream of Education Equality and Adequacy, 62 EMORY L.J. 
1613, 1616 (2013). 
 253. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) (“A 
segregation claim based on racial discrimination is justiciable.”). See Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
254. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). 
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the issue to a coordinate political department,” (2) a lack of 
“judicially discoverable and manageable standards” for resolving the 
claims, and (3) the need for the court to make “an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”255   
1. Baker Factor #1 – Textually Demonstrable Commitment
One primary argument in adequacy cases that present courts 
with nonjusticiable political questions is that “constitutional 
language apparently favoring exclusive legislative responsibility for 
education” amounts to a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment” to the legislature.256 In other words, because most 
education clauses in state constitutions speak only to the legislature’s 
duty to “provide” for the education of the state’s schoolchildren, 
while omitting any mention of judicial review of the constitutionality 
of the legislature’s chosen method of providing for education, there 
must be no such authority vested in the judiciary.257 When examined 
more closely, it becomes clear that this argument “represents a 
fundamentally flawed view of the concept of judicial review.”258  
Scholars have wondered if asking courts to set aside their 
authority because of a “textually demonstrable commitment of the 
issue”259 to another branch of government makes little sense in light 
of the federal Constitution. As Professor Chemerinsky has pointed 
out, “there is no place in the [federal] Constitution, where the text 
states that the legislature or executive should decide whether a 
particular action constitutes a constitutional violation.”260 Professor 
Redish has similarly observed that because there is no clear judicial 
review authority in the federal constitution, “the fact that a provision 
vesting power refers to the political branches and not to the judiciary 
cannot justify a finding of a textual commitment of discretion to the 
political branches, because the same could be said of virtually every 
provision vesting authority in a political branch.”261 
 255. See, e.g., Cruz-Guzman, 849 N.W.2d at 539–41 (applying the three factors of 
the Baker test); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
256. Hubsch, supra note 196, at 115. 
257. See id. at 134. 
258. Redish, supra note 175, at 1033. 
259. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
260. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 176, at 150 (“The Constitution does not mention 
judicial review, much less limit it by creating ‘textually demonstrable commitments’ 
to other branches of government.”). 
261. Redish, supra note 175, at 1040. “It is difficult to construe a constitutional 
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State courts, in adequacy cases, have been similarly dismissive of 
this factor, even where the state constitution clearly assigns the duty 
to the legislature.262 In Neeley, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the 
state’s argument that such a textual assignment satisfied Baker, and 
explained that “by assigning to the Legislature a duty, [the 
constitution] both empowers and obligates.”263 Even though the 
constitution clearly commits to the legislature the authority to make 
education policy, “the Constitution nowhere suggests that the 
Legislature is to be the final authority on whether it has discharged 
its constitutional obligation.”264   
As the Texas court explained, “[i]f the framers had intended 
the Legislature’s discretion to be absolute, they need not have 
mandated that the public education system be efficient and suitable; 
they could instead have provided only that the Legislature provide 
whatever public education it deemed appropriate.”265 Importantly, 
the court clarified that the courts are not excluded merely by the 
mention of legislative prerogative, declaring that “[t]he 
constitutional commitment of public education issues to the 
Legislature is primary but not absolute.”266 Indeed, to leave a state’s 
entire system of education to the legislature without any oversight 
“would be a dangerous doctrine to announce.”267 
provision as excluding judicial review on the basis of the facts that (1) the courts are 
not mentioned, and (2) other branches are mentioned . . . because the power of 
the judiciary to engage in judicial review is not explicitly mentioned in any 
constitutional provision.” Id. at 1042. 
 262. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Construction and Application of Political Question 
Doctrine by State Courts, 9 A.L.R. 6th 177 (2005) (juxtaposing those states that have 
held the right to education—and its funding—to be a political question against 
those states that have not). 
 263. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 
(Tex. 2005) (citing TEX. CONST. art. VII, § 1). 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. The Texas Supreme Court’s ruling was clear: “The final authority to 
determine adherence to the Constitution resides with the Judiciary. . . .” Id. at 777 
(quoting W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 563 
(Tex. 2003)). Other courts have made this same point. See, e.g., Harris v. Shanahan, 
387 P.2d 771, 777 (Kan. 1963) (“In the final analysis, this court is the sole arbiter of 
the question whether an act of the legislature is invalid under the Constitution of 
Kansas.”). 
 267. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1220 (Kan. 2014) (quoting Comm’rs of 
Sedgwick Co. v. Bailey, 13 Kan. 600, 607 (Kan. 1874)). 
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But if carving out certain policy spheres as unreviewable is 
dangerous, the danger is dramatically higher when the issue being 
“textually committed” is the racial makeup of schools.268 Brown 
establishes that the U.S. Constitution forbids the operation of 
educational facilities intentionally segregated by race.269 State 
constitutions cannot grant state agencies discretion to reach beyond 
the bounds of federal constitutionality,270 and, in the case of 
segregation, those bounds are clearly drawn.271 To find otherwise 
would permit a state, at least in some circumstances, to attempt to 
limit the reach of Brown by declaring school segregation a policy 
issue for its legislature.272 At the very least, it may render certain 
issues nonjusticiable political questions in state courts but justiciable 
in federal courts.273 It is unlikely that a state constitution envisions 
such a broad or arbitrary grant of legislative authority; the federal 
Constitution does not.274 It is also unclear how much policy 
discretion over the degree of school segregation a “coordinate 
political department” could allowably be granted.275 Any intentional 
effort to implement a school system with a greater degree of racial 
 268. See generally Michael Besso, Sheff v. O’Neill: The Connecticut Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165, 183–97 (discussing the political climate 
in Connecticut, prior to Sheff, that prevented real legislative change on the topic of 
school racial integration). 
268. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
269. Id. 
270. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 400 (1819) (“The [United States 
C]onstitution . . . shall be the supreme law of the land, and shall control all State
legislation and State constitutions, which may be incompatible therewith. . . .”). 
 271. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (“We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal.”). 
 272. Erika K. Wilson, Blurred Lines: Public School Reforms and the Privatization of 
Public Education, 51 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 189, 191–92 (2016) (“However, 
since at least the 1990s—and some may argue even earlier—federal courts have 
become increasingly hostile to court mandated desegregation schemes.”). 
 273. See Franklin Sacha, Excising Federalism: The Consequences of Baker v. Carr 
Beyond the Electoral Arena, 101 VA. L. REV. 2263, 2294 (2015) (“[T]he court stated that 
the post-Baker political question doctrine did not implicate federalism, as it is ‘based 
on concepts that underlie the separation of powers among the three branches of 
the federal government rather than notions of federalism between the federal 
government and the states’. . . .” (quoting DeJulio v. Georgia, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 
1291 (N.D. Ga. 2001))). 
274. Id. 
275. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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segregation seems likely to run up against constitutional 
safeguards.276
2. Baker Factor #2 – Lack of Standards
Another central argument is that adequacy cases presents courts 
with nonjusticiable political questions because the courts in such 
cases cannot identify any “judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards” for resolving claims of educational inadequacy.277 Under 
this argument, courts are unable to evaluate “inadequate-education 
claims” because they “inevitably require [courts] to define the 
relevant qualitative standard.”278 Professor Redish argues that this 
“so-called ‘absence-of-standards’ rationale borders on the 
disingenuous, because the Supreme Court has never been at a loss 
to decipher roughly workable standards for the vaguest of 
constitutional provisions when it so desires.”279 For example, courts 
have had to determine standards for plenty of vague terminology, 
including what constitutes sufficient “probable cause,”280 whether a 
 276. Policy decisions made with the intent of moving the racial balance of 
schools in a segregative direction likely pose an equal protection problem, as they 
would represent disparate treatment of a group on the basis of membership in a 
protected class. See City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1989) 
(applying strict scrutiny to all race-based classifications in Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection claims). By contrast, policy decisions made with the intent of 
moving the racial balance in schools in an integrative direction may be permissible, 
because there is a compelling government interest in school diversity. Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787–88 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 277. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 539 (citation omitted). See Redish, 
supra note 175, at 1046 (“Perhaps the most widely cited ground in support of the 
prudential [version of the political question] doctrine is the view that certain 
constitutional provisions do not lend themselves to the development of workable 
generalizable standards of construction. . . .”). 
278. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 540. 
 279. Redish, supra note 175, at 1060; Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1228 (Kan. 
2014) (“We also observe that courts are frequently called upon, and adept at, 
defining and applying various, perhaps imprecise, constitutional standards.”); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1275 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s determination 
of what constitutes a judicially manageable standard is “so discretionary . . . that if 
the requirement of judicial manageability [was] applied to the Court’s own decision 
making process . . . the criteria by which the Court identifies judicially 
unmanageable standards might themselves be disqualified as judicially 
unmanageable”). 
280. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975). 
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specific punishment is “cruel and unusual,”281 and what represents 
“equal protection under the laws.”282 As Professor Redish points out, 
“Courts are often called upon to apply generalized and ambiguous 
abstract principles to specific factual situations, even when the 
application of those principles is unclear.”283 As one state supreme 
court summed up, “[t]he judiciary is well-accustomed to applying 
substantive standards the crux of which is reasonableness.”284 In 
comparison, disagreements about the meaning of the state 
constitutional language “are not unique to the [state’s education 
clause]; they persist as to the meanings and applications of due 
course of law, equal protection, and many other constitutional 
provisions. Indeed, those provisions have inspired far more litigation 
than [the state’s education clause].”285  
As one example from the adequacy context, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court found enforceable standards in its state 
constitution’s education clause, which merely provided that “[t]here 
shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the 
state” and that “[t]he general assembly shall implement this 
principle by appropriate legislation.”286 The court acknowledged this 
language was less specific than that found in some other state 
constitutions’ education clauses,287 but nevertheless held that such 
language: 
embodies a substantive component requiring that the 
public schools provide their students with an education 
suitable to give them the opportunity to be responsible 
citizens able to participate fully in democratic institutions, 
such as jury service and voting, and to prepare them to 
progress to institutions of higher education, or to attain 
productive employment and otherwise to contribute to the 
state’s economy.288  
281. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 243–47 (1972). 
 282. Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 
214 (1944) (discussing how legal restrictions targeted at a specific racial group are 
subject to the highest scrutiny under Equal Protection principles). 
283. Redish, supra note 175, at 1050. 
284. Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist, 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 
(Tex. 2005). 
285. Id. at 779. 
 286. Conn. Coal. for Just. in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 228 
(Conn. 2010) (quoting CONN. CONST. art. 8, § 1). 
287. Id. at 223. 
288. Id. at 227. 
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The court explained that “[t]o satisfy this standard, the state, 
through the local school districts, must provide students with an 
objectively ‘meaningful opportunity’ to receive the benefits of this 
constitutional right.”289  
Even though constitutional standards in educational adequacy 
cases “import a wide spectrum of considerations and are admittedly 
imprecise . . . they are not without content.”290 In Rose, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court examined its constitution’s education clause which 
simply provided, “[t]he General Assembly shall, by appropriate 
legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools 
throughout the State.”291 The Rose court held that this constitutional 
provision “requires the General Assembly to establish a system of 
common schools that provides an equal opportunity for children to 
have an adequate education.”292 It then articulated standards for 
measuring compliance with the provision, which have been adopted 
by numerous state courts across the country.293 Similarly, other state 
supreme courts have concluded that discerning standards to 
interpret their states’ education articles is well within their judicial 
authority.294  
289. Id. at 253–54. 
 290. Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 778 
(Tex. 2005). 
291. KY. CONST. § 183; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 
211 (Ky. 1989). 
292. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211. 
 293. See Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1236 (Kan. 2014) (officially adopting 
Rose standards and noting that other courts had done so); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. 
Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997) (“We view these guidelines as 
benchmarks of a constitutionally adequate public education.”); McDuffy v. Sec’y of 
the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (“These guidelines 
accord with our Constitution’s emphasis on educating our children to become free 
citizens on whom the [State] may rely to meet its needs and to further its interests.”). 
 294. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254–55 (N.C. 1997) (following 
Rose criteria for defining constitutional adequacy); Claremont Sch. Dist., 703 A.2d at 
1359–60 (same); McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 554 (same). See Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 540 (S.C. 1999) (interpreting the constitution to require a 
“minimally adequate education,” which includes “[1] the ability to read, write, and 
speak the English language, and knowledge of mathematics and physical science; 
[2] a fundamental knowledge of economic, social, and political systems, and of 
history and governmental processes; and [3] academic and vocational skills.”); 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 94–95 (Wash. 1978) 
(identifying “broad educational concepts”—designed to allow students to 
adequately participate in our political system, the labor market, and in the market 
place of ideas—to guide the legislature in its duty to “make ample provision for the 
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In school segregation cases, however, courts need not even 
reach the question of whether devising new standards is appropriate. 
That is because they are governed by robust preexisting standards, 
developed to resolve precisely the problem at hand.295 These 
standards have been laid out over the course of many U.S. Supreme 
Court and other federal cases.296 More than being “discoverable and 
manageable,”297 the judicial standards that govern school 
desegregation played a key role in 20th and 21st century American 
history.298 Likewise, federal law establishes a clear endpoint for 
desegregation measures. Formerly de jure segregated school systems 
are released from their constitutional burdens when they are 
deemed unitary.299  
There is, of course, one important distinction between the 
standards used in federal and state school desegregation lawsuits: the 
former is premised on allegations of intentional segregation, while 
the latter need not be. However, this distinction is less significant 
than it initially appears, due to the broad scope of the required 
remedies in a federal desegregation suit.300 The Supreme Court’s 
expansive school desegregation jurisprudence required the 
elimination of any vestige of state-operated segregation in a dual 
system, and would therefore, in many cases, require the elimination 
of most segregation within that system.301 Consequently, the task 
undertaken by a federal court resolving a desegregation claim is 
unlikely to differ much in scope or scale from the task faced by a 
state court. In both instances, the courts are being asked to achieve 
a similar outcome: the eradication of segregation within a school 
system.  
education of all children”). 
 295. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 
(1968). 
296. See supra note 295. 
297. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 224 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)). 
298. Karl A. Cole-Frieman, A Retrospective of Brown v. Board of Education: The 
Ghosts of Segregation Still Haunt Topeka, Kansas: A Case Study on the Role of the Federal 
Courts in School Desegregation, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 3 (1996). 
 299. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991); 
Green, 391 U.S. at 430. 
300. See supra Section III.A. 
301. Id. 
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3. Baker Factor #3 – Initial Policy Determination
The third Baker factor precludes a court from adjudicating a 
case where it is impossible to decide the outcome “without an initial 
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”302 
Defendants in adequacy cases argue that measuring adequacy 
through educational metrics, such as test scores and graduation 
rates, requires courts to establish education policy.303 Some courts 
worry that assessing whether states have “failed to provide an 
adequate education would require [courts] to first determine the 
applicable standard, which is ‘an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.’”304 Such a determination 
“rests in educational policy and is entrusted to the legislature, and 
not the judicial branch,” according to this line of reasoning.305  
But there is a reason why the U.S. Supreme Court has not used 
the third, rather obscure, Baker factor to dismiss a case on political 
question grounds.306 Given the cases cited by the Court in Baker to 
develop the six factor test,307 it would appear that the third factor 
“means something other than a requirement that the political 
branches identify and assign weight to broad policy considerations 
relevant to the controversy” before determining entitlement to 
relief.308 The more appropriate basis for the third factor is an inquiry 
302. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 303. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191–92 (Ill. 1996) 
(explaining that the case was nonjusticiable because the separation of powers 
doctrine prohibits a court from making an “initial policy determination,” and the 
court would not “presume to lay down guidelines or ultimatums for [the 
legislature].”); Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017) 
(“[Plaintiffs] attempt to gauge adequacy based on student-performance measures 
such as standardized test scores and graduation rates[;] defining the necessary 
qualitative standard inevitably requires the judiciary to establish educational 
policy. . . .”). 
304. Cruz-Guzman, 892 N.W.2d at 539 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). 
305. Id. 
306. See Kimberly Breedon, Remedial Problems at the Intersection of the Political 
Question Doctrine, the Standing Doctrine, and the Doctrine of Equitable Discretion, 34 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 523, 538 (2008) (finding that no Supreme Court case has used the third 
factor to establish nonjusticiability). 
 307. See Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884) (holding that courts cannot recognize 
diplomatic privilege until the executive determines diplomatic status); Doe v. 
Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1850) (holding that courts cannot interpret 
interests protected by a treaty until the executive branch first determines whether 
such a treaty is in effect). 
308. Breedon, supra note 306, at 539. 
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into “whether a particular and discrete diplomatic determination by 
a political branch about a party to, or a fact in, the specific 
controversy . . . must be made before the court can decide the legal 
issues.”309  
As scholars have cautioned, “the third Baker factor is arguably 
the one most susceptible to an overly broad application.”310 This 
likely tendency toward broader application of the third Baker factor 
is because courts recognize that “mak[ing] law or . . . extend[ing] 
existing law beyond the limits of proper interpretation . . . is a 
political responsibility, and whether to do so [is] a ‘political 
question.’” 311 Application of the third factor is reserved for only 
extreme cases, not the run-of-the-mill assessment of liability or 
constitutionality.312 This is because the third Baker factor “requires 
courts to evaluate whether it would be impossible to decide the case 
without making an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
involving nonjudicial discretion.”313 In other words, “a political 
question under the third factor exists when, to resolve a dispute, the 
court must make a policy judgment of a legislative nature, rather 
than resolving the dispute through legal and factual analysis.”314   
Once again, though, these questions are simplified in the 
instance of a school segregation claim. This is because one of the 
most important policy judgments—the status of segregated schools 
vis a vis integrated or racially diverse schools—is already settled, and 
cannot be altered. All state courts are bound by Brown’s 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 598 
(1976). 
 312. In Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., for example, the court 
found that the third Baker factor applied, only because “Plaintiffs are in effect asking 
this Court to make a political judgment that the two dozen Defendants named in 
this action should be the only ones to bear the cost of contributing to global 
warming.” 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2009). By contrast, claims that are 
merely political in nature but do not include any contradictory actions or statements 
from the legislature or executive branches, do not rise to the level of a Baker factor 
three application. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 
F. Supp. 2d 291, 303–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 313. In re MTBE, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 301; In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 
373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d sub nom. Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of 
Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 314. Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 456 F.3d 363, 388 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
51
Stancil and Hilbert: Justiciability of State Law School Segregation Claims
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2018
450 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:2 
determination that racial segregation is inherently unequal.315 As a 
matter of law, the inherent inequality of segregated schools is 
binding and unbreakable: no “policy judgment of a legislative 
nature” by state lawmakers can adjust that determination by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.316 
A simple statement of two schools’ inherent inequality is not 
sufficient to fully resolve a segregation claim.317 But it gives courts a 
starting point, rather than asking them to simply invent standards by 
themselves. And to the extent that further determinations are 
needed, the mere existence of Brown and its progeny undermines 
the idea that “policy determinations” related to school segregation 
are “of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.”318 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has stated quite broadly the opposite: that when 
faced with an actionable claim of racial segregation, “judicial 
authority may be invoked,” and “the scope of a district court’s 
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and 
flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.”319 Surely this is no less 
true when the wrong inflicted is a state’s failure, through 
maintenance of a segregated school system, to fulfill a constitutional 
duty or vindicate a fundamental right. 
B. Judicial Competence to Resolve Segregation Suits 
The Baker v. Carr factors are not the end of the issue. State courts 
may apply their own unique interpretations of justiciability doctrine, 
and without clearly established standards, it is difficult to address 
those situations hypothetically.320 However, one particular concern 
315. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
 316. See Gross, 456 F.3d at 388 (discussing how the third Baker factor is implicated 
when courts are asked to make a “policy judgement of a legislative nature”). 
317. Peter M. Shane, Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1050 (1984) (discussing how the harms cited in Brown should 
only be a “starting point for analysis and [one must] take account also of subsequent 
research into the nature of racial inequality”). 
 318. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 (holding that school desegregation is a justiciable 
issue); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (discussing the third Baker 
factor: “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion”). 
319. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). 
 320. See generally Hershkoff, supra note 183, at 1844. (discussing how the courts 
in some states “undertake and discharge functions that are conventionally deemed 
beyond the Article III power, functions that commentators often characterize as 
essentially nonjudicial because they are outside understood limits on judicial 
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often seems to underlie the application of the political question 
doctrine to educational adequacy claims, and that concern can be 
addressed.321 
Scholars who have written on the intersection of the political 
question doctrine and educational adequacy have noted that 
dismissals seem to be rooted in underlying worries about a court’s 
“institutional competence” to adjudicate complex policy issues.322 
The resolution of a school finance case could require a court to delve 
into the intricacies of funding formulas, research on educational 
evaluation, or the minute details of municipal finance. Accepting 
this obligation can immerse courts in what might seem like an 
unwanted quagmire.323 
Recent trends in some adequacy cases may be exacerbating the 
problem.324 A 2010 article wondered if judges’ concerns with 
particular litigation strategies—especially “specific monetary 
demands” and “increasing[] focus[] on appropriations as the 
benchmark and remedy”—was behind several recent justiciability 
dismissals by state courts.325 The article argued that these ultra-
specific litigation demands were pushing courts away from their 
“traditional judicial role”:326 declaring a system unconstitutional and 
allowing legislatures an opportunity to enact a remedy before 
proactively intervening.327 
capacity”). 
321. Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 13, at 118. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. at 117–18 (explaining how challenges to school finance systems can 
overburden courts with extensive litigation). 
 324. Id. at 88 (“Although adequacy suits have done much to increase funding, 
improve schools, and draw attention to the children left behind by the political 
process, courts looking to other states also see interminable litigation, ever-growing 
demands from plaintiffs, and tension-fraught showdowns between the judiciary and 
legislatures.”). 
325. Id. at 88–90. 
326. Id. at 88. 
 327. For example, shortly after Minnesota’s recent segregation case was 
dismissed by a state court of appeals on justiciability grounds, a second adequacy 
suit reached the same court. Forslund v. State, No. 62-CV-16-2161, 2017 WL 3864082 
(Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2017). This second case used Minnesota’s constitutional 
education provisions to attack the state’s teacher tenure law, making the very 
specific claim that teacher tenure statutes unconstitutionally burden the right to an 
adequate education. Id. at *1. It, too, was dismissed on justiciability grounds, with 
the court pointing out that resolution of the claim would require it to, among other 
things, “defin[e] both what an effective teacher is and what level or prevalence of 
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At first blush, educational adequacy cases that focus on 
segregation raise similar concerns. Remedies are sure to be elaborate 
and require development of a certain degree of expertise.328 
Segregation cases are also sure to be lengthy—no dual school system 
has ever been eliminated in a month.329  
But the long legacy of school desegregation litigation should 
help inoculate such cases against the greatest worries of this nature. 
Unlike virtually every other case dealing with school conditions, 
desegregation lawsuits can safely build off Brown’s definitive 
statement that segregated schools are inherently unequal.330 And if 
segregation cases require expertise, it is expertise courts have 
demonstrated themselves to possess over the course of hundreds of 
federal lawsuits.331 Prior segregation cases also provide a reasonable, 
time-tested pathway for gradually escalating intervention. First, an 
instruction to the relevant educational authorities to correct the 
offending condition; only if they fail to do so would a court typically 
take jurisdiction and intervene more directly.332 Moreover, even in 
the event that court-directed remedies become necessary, there is 
much national experience with this type of remedy.333 A court 
resolving a segregation case, unlike a court resolving other 
educational adequacy claims, need not worry about its remedial 
efforts stumbling into some heretofore unknown usurpation of 
legislative power.334 Instead, it will be walking well-trodden ground, 
ineffectiveness in teaching represents an inadequate education.” Id. at *3. 
 328. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 101, at 1187 (analyzing 126 written opinions 
regarding court-ordered desegregation for 138 school districts). 
329. Id. 
330. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S 483, 495 (1954). 
331. One 2000 study, looking at just three federal judicial districts in the South, 
found 192 districts covered by desegregation orders. Parker, supra note 101, at 1187. 
 332. See, e.g., Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 860 F. Supp. 1563, 1564–66 (S.D. Ga. 
1994) (describing the court’s instructions and subsequent involvement in a 
desegregation plan). 
 333. See, e.g., Robert E. Buckholz, Jr., et al., The Remedial Process in Institutional 
Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 799–800 (1978) (illustrating the remedial 
approach of “remedial abstention,” in which defendants are permitted to develop 
their own remedies, before eventual appointment of a court expert as a pressure 
mechanism to encourage compliance (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971))). See generally Zelden, supra note 74, at 471 (describing 
the gradual development of new proactive desegregation remedies by district 
courts). 
 334. See, e.g., Zelden, supra note 74, at 528 (“[I]t was the federal courts that 
ultimately shaped the desegregation process: setting standards, promoting 
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with well-drawn boundaries.335 In short, the judicial branch has been 
doing this sort of thing for a very long time.336 It has previously been 
asked to—and did—retain jurisdiction for years by monitoring, 
approving, or requiring changes in virtually every area of school 
operations.337 Courts can surely do this sort of thing again, even if 
the initial claims are marginally different. 
As a practical matter, from the perspective of plaintiffs, it would 
be faintly absurd for a court, faced with one allegation of 
segregation, to take jurisdiction and institute a far-reaching series of 
changes, and then, faced with a slightly different allegation of 
segregation, to dismiss the case, disclaiming the whole problem as 
outside its purview. If plaintiffs’ right to integrated schools in a 
unitary system could be vindicated before, surely it can be vindicated 
now. 
VI. CONCLUSION
Time and again, the court system has been called to uphold 
constitutional rights guaranteeing equal and adequate education.338 
First, these battles were waged primarily in federal courts, and fought 
over intentional segregation. Then, they moved into state courts and 
were fought over financing and funding.339 Now, there may be an 
opportunity to combine these two trends, and, using the guarantees 
of state constitutions, fulfill the promise of integrated schools in 
places where desegregation was never completed or never took in 
the first place. 
By and large, courts have accepted the burden of acting as the 
guarantor of constitutional education requirements.340 School 
segregation poses a burden of a different sort—perhaps a much 
methods, integrating the efforts of other agencies, and ultimately, judging success 
or failure.”). 
 335. See id.; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 20–31 (1971) (addressing a wide range of 
allowable remedies in school desegregation lawsuits). 
 336. See Zelden, supra note 74 (describing the judicial branch’s work in 
desegregation from the years 1968–1974 and expressing the effects of which are still 
felt in current day). 
 337. See Swann, 402 U.S., at 18–21 (discussing several judicial holdings as to 
various aspects of school operations). 
 338. See Parker, supra note 101, at 1187 (describing an empirical study of 
hundreds of judicial orders involving desegregation for schools in the South). 
339. See supra Part II.B. 
340. See supra Part I.A. 
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larger one. But the American judicial branch’s long history of 
pursuing the unification of formerly divided school districts proves 
that the judicial system is equal to the challenge.341 Courts should 
recognize the justiciability of state law segregation claims and accept 
that challenge. 
 341. See, e.g., Dennis G. Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 41, 70 (1986) (“In 1955, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
appropriate remedy [to remedy constitutional wrong inflicted upon minority 
groups] was to be unitary schools. . . . The racially identifiable schools of a dual 
system have been largely eliminated, so we now have neither ‘black’ schools nor 
‘white’ schools but just schools.”). 
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